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Qualitative, Quantitative, and Integrative Conservation 
Jamison E. Colburn  
INTRODUCTION 
Conservation is being overtaken by the same quantitative thinking 
that dominates risk regulation today. ―Risk regulation,‖ traditionally 
conceived, ―addresses the risk of harm that technology creates for 
individuals and the environment.‖1 In this light, environmental 
statutes like the Clean Air Act (―CAA‖), Clean Water Act (―CWA‖), 
and Toxic Substances Control Act (―TSCA‖) are the legal extensions 
of probabilism and the ―rational‖ pursuit of public health and 
safety—with conservation statutes like the Endangered Species Act 
(―ESA‖) following right behind them.2 They each invest power in an 
administrative agency by authorizing it to prohibit behaviors of a 
certain kind which it finds too risky given the probabilities of harmful 
consequences.
3
 Before they can act, however, the agencies normally 
must make certain required findings or determinations, based on 
evidence and usually according to disparate criteria fixed (or implied) 
 
  Professor of Law, Penn State University. My thanks to Professors Dan Tarlock and 
Daniel Mandelker for organizing the symposium and for inviting me to take part. 
 1. SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK ix (2003). 
 2. See, e.g., Office of the Science Advisor, U.S. EPA, EXAMINATION OF EPA RISK 
ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 2 (2004), http://www.epa.gov/OSA/pdfs/ratf-final. 
pdf (―This process is highly interdisciplinary in that it draws from such diverse fields as 
biology, toxicology, ecology, engineering, geology, statistics, and the social sciences to create a 
rational framework for evaluating environmental hazards.‖). The National Research Council 
explicitly recommended that risk analysis become the paradigm in conservation over a decade 
ago. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 99–
112 (1995) [hereinafter SCIENCE AND THE ESA]. That paradigm famously separates ―risk 
assessment‖ from ―risk management,‖ largely in an effort to insulate the former from the 
political vicissitudes of the latter. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND 
DECISIONS: ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT 241–42 (2009) [hereinafter SCIENCE AND 
DECISIONS]. 
 3. See, e.g., SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 26–58 (describing the evolution 
and use of risk assessment at EPA). 
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by the governing statute(s), subject to judicial review.
4
 Not 
surprisingly, these laws have become—with help from administrative 
law—enmeshed in the parametric controversies of epidemiological 
inference,
5
 cost/benefit analysis,
6
 and time discounting,
7
 to say 
nothing of the metaphysics of statistical lives
8
 and a slew of other 
ethical dilemmas that come along for the ride when we try to quantify 
risk.  
With the rise of ―ecosystem services‖9 and other quasi-
monetizable values in conservation, not to mention the increasing 
salience of ―measurable goals,‖10 it seems as if we are entering 
conservation‘s quantitative age. Not so long ago, the concept of risk 
was foreign to conservation practitioners.
11
 Today, ―biodiversity‖ has 
become conservation‘s lingua franca, linking it directly to—if not 
collapsing it into—the risks of extirpation/extinction and the 
ecosystemic upsets it can bring. In this Article, I use the ESA to 
locate an important pivot we have reached in conservation more 
generally, a point at which we will choose (wittingly or not) how we 
face the looming crises of biodiversity loss. The more we learn about 
evolutionary and molecular genetics, biochemistry, geoclimatology, 
and many other dimensions of ecosystem composition and function, 
the more able we are to express the questions of conservation as 
matters of probability and risk. Yet, the more we express 
conservation‘s questions as matters of risk, the less able we seem to 
 
 4. See generally A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 
(John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005). 
 5. See generally Kenneth J. Rothman & Sander Greenland, Causation and Causal 
Inference in Epidemiology, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 144 (2005). 
 6. See generally MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW AND 
ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 2008).  
 7. See generally RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds. 1995) [hereinafter RISK 
VERSUS RISK].  
 8. See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING 
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004). 
 9. See, e.g., J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2007). 
 10. See, e.g., Timothy H. Tear et al., How Much Is Enough? The Recurrent Problem of 
Setting Measurable Objective in Conservation, 55(10) BIOSCIENCE 843, 847 (2005). 
 11. See John Harwood, Risk Assessment and Decision Analysis in Conservation, 95 BIO. 
CONSERV. 219 (2000) (―[L]ess than 1% of the 1400 plus papers published in the journals 
Biological Conservation and Conservation Biology since January 1995 include the words ‗risk‘ 
or ‗uncertainty‘ in their title, and nearly half of those involve [three authors].‖). 
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be to grasp and communicate them as meaningful and momentous 
choices in life. This is doubly true for the conservation statute with 
the broadest scale and scope: the ESA. This is not to say that people 
who deal in risk and probabilistic reasoning do not know what is 
important. To the contrary, my claim is that when we shift expressive 
frames toward quantification and probabilism, we tend to lose our 
collective grip of these choices as tangibly democratic questions. This 
stems from much more than the mere innumeracy of our median 
voter. In this Article, I use the evolution of ESA practice to 
summarize the much larger landscape of conservation‘s troubles in 
contemporary democratic societies. In my view, this can be summed 
up as the following progression and consequent imperative: 
qualitative thinking inevitably begets quantitative ambitions, but the 
real work of practical problem-solving demands that we find ways of 
integrating the two into a symbiotic—and therefore reciprocal—
relationship. 
I. TWO ASSUMPTIONS: A PROLOGUE 
The last three decades have established two undeniable realities 
for conservation. Because the past cannot predict the future,
12
 I 
present them here as assumptions going forward. To whatever extent 
they prove inaccurate, so much the better: it will mean more 
possibilities exist than I suspect. First, it seems clear that the support 
of the public fisc for acquiring and/or regulating natural resources for 
the sake of their conservation is, at best, level and more likely 
diminishing in proportion to recognizable needs. As a society, we are 
identifying urgent conservation needs much more rapidly than we are 
investing in them.
13
 Secondly, though related to the first assumption, 
 
 12. If only our financial regulators had kept this fundamental premise in mind over the 
last decade. Cf. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 
(1996) (tracing the cultural history of risk and risk analysis in financial ordering from 1200 to 
the present and conjecturing that people will forever mistake inductive prediction for deductive 
truth). 
 13. One response to this framing of the assumption is to advocate for vastly expanding the 
scale and scope of regulatory or ―police‖ power so that natural resources not owned/possessed 
by the public can be conserved nonetheless. For both normative and practical reasons explained 
in Parts I, II, and III below, I regard this as a tragically incomplete—though certainly not 
wholly mistaken—response to our predicament.  
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the costs of lawmaking and administration now drive the institutions 
that define legal practice and this is nowhere more manifest than in 
biodiversity conservation by the federal government.
14
 As 
administrative actions of all kinds have become enmeshed in conflict, 
procedure, and factual uncertainty, the agencies charged with the 
public‘s conservation agenda have shifted strategies to make use of 
increasingly administrative mechanisms, driving more and more of 
conservation practice further and further from public view. Part I 
unpacks these two framing assumptions. 
A. Public Investment in Conservation Will Not Keep Pace with 
Identified Needs 
For the ten year period from 1992–2001, federal and state 
authorities ―spent‖ about thirty-two billion dollars on conservation 
land acquisition alone.
15
 For the ten year period from fiscal year 
1996–2004, non-land-acquisition expenses incurred by the federal 
government in connection with specific listed taxa averaged $562.9 
million per fiscal year.
16
 Of course, compared to a thirteen trillion 
dollar economy literally predicated on cost-externalization and the 
extraction, liquidation, and consumption of natural resources (both 
here and abroad), this number—which has been leveling off lately—
is cause for concern. With the possible exception of the Forest 
Service‘s seemingly intractable ―roadless area‖ conservation 
 
 14. From about 1964 to 1976, public lands and other natural resource legislation in this 
country was thoroughly remade, essentially creating a zoning system that allocates lands 
according to a variety of use priorities and a range of use intensities, and which locked the 
agencies administering these statutes under a variety of procedural obligations. See Jamison E. 
Colburn, Habitat and Humanity: Public Lands Law in the Age of Ecology, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
145, 170–95 (2007). 
 15. See Jeff Lerner et al., What’s in Noah’s Wallet? Land Conservation Spending in the 
United States, 57 BIOSCIENCE 419, 420 (2007). ―Acreage figures would be a good complement 
to dollars spent, but such figures were not available, and they too can be double-counted by 
conservation partners.‖ Id. at 421. This level of funding is well below the ―estimated $5.4 
billion to $7.7 billion per year needed to create a national network of habitat conservation areas, 
and it is unlikely that private and local government sources will completely fill the gap.‖ Id. at 
422. 
 16. The ESA section 18 fiscal reports are an example of hopelessly shifty accounting. 
From 1996–2004, however, FWS at least reported on identifiable ―per-species‖ expenditures 
other than land acquisition—a category that then shifted again in Fiscal Year 2005.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/8
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initiative,
17
 or the recent (fitful) expansion of the National Wilderness 
Preservation System,
18
 the trends on public lands have been against 
the acquisition and/or protection of nature for its own sake.
19
 
Increasingly severe droughts and fires, marked increases in 
recreational intensity, and continued wildland sprawl all 
counterbalance these comparatively small preservation projects.
20
 A 
positive growth curve in ―units‖ of the National Wildlife Refuge 
System
21
 is a far cry from positive growth in total area or ―primary 
constituent elements‖22 of healthy, resilient landscapes.23 The 
 
 17. The Roadless Area Conservation Rule (a rule designed to prohibit the further roading 
of inventories roadless areas within the National Forest System), promulgated at the end of the 
Clinton Administration, has been embroiled in litigation and Forest Service reconsiderations for 
almost a decade now.  
 18. See Omnibus Public Lands Law of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–11, to be codified 
throughout Title 16 U.S.C. 
 19. The Forest Service‘s reasons for its roadless area rule were several, but habitat 
conservation was among them. See U.S. Forest Service, Notice of Final Rulemaking, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 3244, 3252 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294). The avowed objective 
was to ―prohibit[] road construction, reconstruction, and timber harvest in inventoried roadless 
areas because they have the greatest likelihood of altering and fragmenting landscapes, resulting 
in immediate, long-term loss of roadless area values and characteristics.‖ 66 Fed. Reg. at 3244. 
The ―values or features‖ that were said to ―often characterize inventoried roadless areas‖ were 
(1) high quality or undisturbed soil, water, and air; (2) sources of public drinking water; (3) 
diversity of plant and animal communities; (4) habitat for threatened, endangered, proposed, 
candidate, and sensitive species and for those species dependent on large, undisturbed areas of 
land; (5) primitive classes of recreation; (6) the provision of a ―reference landscape‖ 
independent of human alteration; (7) traditional and sacred cultural sites/properties; and (8) 
various locally defined unique characteristics such as geological formations. Id. at 3245. 
Throughout the Notices of the rulemaking, these eight categories were referred to as ―roadless 
area values.‖ The inventory was ultimately comprised of 58.5 million acres (almost two percent 
of the nation‘s land), although a common attack mounted to the finalized rule highlighted the 
fact that no definitive maps of these areas were created specifying their boundaries. See, e.g., 
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1244–46 (D. Idaho 2001).  
 20. See Robert B. Keiter, Breaking Faith with Nature: The Bush Administration and 
Public Land Policy, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 195 (2007). 
 21. Many have noted the swift growth of the National Wildlife Refuge System, both in 
acreage and in administrative units, since its establishment as a separate ―system‖ in 1966. See, 
e.g., ROBERT L. FISCHMAN, THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES: COORDINATING A 
CONSERVATION SYSTEM THROUGH LAW 64–76, 237–49 (2003). 
 22. In designating listed species‘ ―critical habitat,‖ the Services are required to identify 
―the specific areas within the geographic area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed . . . 
on which are found those physical or biological feature (I) essential to the conservation of the 
species and (II) which may require special management considerations or protection,‖ and any 
―specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is listed . . . 
upon a determination by the Secretary that such areas are essential to the conservation of the 
species.‖ 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (emphasis added). The Services have settled on identifying 
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landscapes that conservation managers are actually confronting today 
are dominated by the intermixture of jurisdictional authorities, the 
diverse spatial and temporal scales of change and human activity, and 
geoclimatic changes that are now under the study of legions of 
scientists. Most recently, the ―adaptive ecosystem management‖ tide 
seems to have rolled out as fast as it came in, due at least in part to 
the informational enormity of ecosystems and our obvious 
incompetence regarding things so vast and unstable.
24
  
Since 1988, the ESA has made fiscal reporting a core part of the 
Fish and Wildlife Service‘s duties. The 1988 Amendments added 
new ESA section 18 and required annualized accounting of 
expenditures made by all federal agencies and by states for the 
―conservation‖ of listed species; the Amendments also required that 
this accounting be reported to Congress.
25
 As these reports have been 
compiled, several numerical baselines have shifted, making year-to-
year comparisons difficult.
26
 One thing is easily inferred, though: the 
fiscal data Congress has been collecting about the ESA‘s several 
different programs has been growing finer-grained and is being 
managed more shrewdly. Indeed, frustratingly, expenditures by 
species and action-type are perhaps the two best data streams to 
which Congress has access where conservation is concerned today.  
The conservation movement‘s reaction to the growing deficits in 
public capacity and support has been, in essence, to privatize. The 
Nature Conservancy, the Trust for Public Land, and an ever-
expanding population of local land trusts have been the fastest 
 
the ―primary constituent elements‖ in such ―specific areas‖ including space for individual and 
population growth; food, water, air, light, minerals, or other nutritional or physiological 
requirements; cover or shelter; sites for breeding, reproduction, rearing of offspring, 
germination, or seed dispersal;‖ and other habitats ―representative of the historic geographical 
and ecological distribution of the species.‖ 50 C.F.R. 424.12(b)(1)–(5) (2008).  
 23. See Jamison E. Colburn, The Indignity of Federal Wildlife Habitat Law, 57 ALA. L. 
REV. 417 (2005). 
 24. See Fikret Berkes & Carl Folke, Back to the Future: Ecosystem Dynamics and Local 
Knowledge, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL 
SYSTEMS 121 (Lance Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002).  
 25. Pub. L. No. 100-478, 102 Stat. 2306 et seq., codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1544(1)–(2).  
 26. The major complication for any trend analysis is what is counted as expenditure ―for‖ 
a listed species or pursuant to the ESA as opposed to other programmatic responsibilities. Many 
funding synergies and/or overlapping agency missions deprive any such accounting of its value.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/8
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growing sectors of the conservation movement for decades.
27
 Besides 
the public shortfalls, though, the trend has been fueled in good part 
by the anti-government rhetoric that has pervaded our public sphere 
for generations.
28
 Fear of government is at least as powerful an 
influence in our political culture as the fear of environmental loss.
29
 
Regardless of Washington‘s peaks and valleys, the relative decline of 
conservation investment seems to be a reality going forward and will 
likely complicate conservation‘s future as much as it has its 
adolescence.  
B. The Rise (and Rise) of Agency Informality: Soft Law’s Empire 
Since 1984, when Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., was decided, the federal courts have moved 
through various stages of evolution in the deference they afford to 
agency interpretations of law. In applying Chevron, the lower federal 
courts have struggled to define their institutional role,
30
 to apply a 
poorly designed and poorly administered judicial test,
31
 and to map 
out an incompletely theorized normative and institutional landscape 
that includes not only legislation, but also administration, political 
initiative, and judicial precedent.
32
 The more we encounter agency 
 
 27. SALLY FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE: THE LIMITS OF LAND ACQUISITION AS A 
CONSERVATION STRATEGY, 1780–2004 (2005); RICHARD BREWER, CONSERVANCY: THE LAND 
TRUST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (2003). 
 28. See generally FAIRFAX ET AL., supra note 27. ―The hallmark of American politics . . . 
is the distinctive way in which power has long been distributed along an exceedingly complex 
array of persons, associations, and institutions that are not easily categorized as fundamentally 
either public or private.‖ William J. Novak, Public-Private Governance: A Historical 
Introduction, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 23, 
27 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009). 
 29. Cf. COREY ROBIN, FEAR: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL IDEA 200–25 (2004) (tracing 
the fear of government throughout American political and constitutional traditions). 
 30. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006). 
 31. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: 
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008) (tracing the history of Supreme Court applications and constructions of 
Chevron and finding pronounced irregularities). 
 32. See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of 
Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64 (2008); Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, 
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interpretations of law in all their diversity, the fewer assurances we 
have about the practical authority of agency actions within our legal 
traditions. The result has been an effusive—if also inconclusive—
debate surrounding foundational normative questions about our 
administrative state.
33
 The questions run from why we ought to defer 
to agency authority,
34
 to when and why Congress actually delegates 
authority to agencies,
35
 to the assumptions underlying any such 
normative analysis
36—and a host of gradations in between.  
Not surprisingly, in the ESA—as in nature—hybridity has been 
the trend. Sorting out law, policy, and discretion seems to grow more 
challenging every year. The statute itself offers little help. ESA 
section 4 speaks of ―guidelines‖ and recovery ―plans‖ that the 
Secretary must ―establish,‖ ―develop,‖ and publish in the Federal 
Register.
37
 It obliges the Secretary to create and publicize such 
norms, but it is silent on their enactment or force as law. So they have 
come to occupy a variety of cryptic stations in our legal system. They 
are each a type of agency ―rule‖ shy of the ―regulations‖ codified in 
 
Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791 
(2009). 
 33. Elsewhere, I argue that the evolution toward increasingly informal mechanisms of 
lawmaking is gradually undermining traditional notions of agencies as sources of law. See 
Jamison E. Colburn, Agency Interpretations, 82 TEMP. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 34. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF 
GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008). 
 35. Compare Bamberger, supra note 32 (drawing out the tensions inherent in ascribing 
purposes to Congress when allocating interpretive authority between courts and agencies), with 
Lisa Shultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 553 (2008) (setting out a series of 
hypothetical circumstances in which Congress ―likely delegates authority to agencies‖ based on 
public choice theory).  
 36. A variety of methodological disputes now engulf the claims of ―rational choice‖ social 
science and, with it, positive political theory as applied in law. Compare Daryl J. Levinson, 
Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005) (contesting 
the claim that government officials have actual incentives to engage in self-aggrandizing 
behaviors), with Yochai Benkler, Commons-based Peer Production and Virtue, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 
394 (2006) (challenging rational choice theory‘s explanation of motivation-biased cognition 
with evidence from digitally networked environments); see generally CROLEY, supra note 34; 
Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the 
Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 13 (2004); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE 
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
 37. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(h) (―The Secretary shall establish, and publish in the Federal 
Register, agency guidelines to insure that the purposes of this section are achieved efficiently 
and effectively.‖); id. § 1533(f) (―The Secretary shall develop and implement plans . . . for the 
conservation and survival of endangered species . . . .‖). 
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the Code of Federal Regulations (―CFR‖).38 They seem like more 
than the transient ―interpretations‖ we so often encounter in litigation, 
guidance, notices, circulars, etc. Pinning them down with definite 
labels from traditional principles of administrative law may be more 
trouble than it is worth. Internationalists have a term, ―soft law,‖ 
which was first used to refer to weaker, non-binding instruments like 
U.N. General Assembly resolutions. Yet it has gradually expanded in 
step with an evolving category of ―quasi-binding‖ instruments that 
now dominate international law.
39
 If there is a domestic equivalent, 
the Services‘ guidelines and plans are in the mix. 
Of course, the ―protective regulations‖ the Secretary must develop 
―as [s/he] deems necessary and advisable to provide for the 
conservation of [listed] species‖40 were clearly meant to possess the 
force of law.
41
 But this rigid system of prohibitions, though still 
prominent in our collective consciousness of the ESA,
42
 is mediated 
by the many plans, policies, guidelines, and manuals
43
 the Services 
maintain. They indirectly govern the scope of ESA sections 7 and 9, 
the Act‘s two duty-creating parts. Thus, a series of policies published 
in the Federal Register, constantly followed and cited as controlling 
 
 38. On the proliferating varieties of such ―rules,‖ both under our own Administrative 
Procedure Act and within the European Union‘s nascent administrative system, see Peter L. 
Strauss, Rulemaking in the Ages of Globalization and Information: What America Can Learn 
from Europe, and Vice Versa, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 645 (2005). 
 39. See, e.g., Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 499, 
510–14 (1999). My thanks to Dan Tarlock for reminding me of this term‘s place in international 
law. 
 40. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d). 
 41. See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 51 (4th ed. 
2006); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The 
Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002).  
 42. See STEVEN L. YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1982). Since Yaffee wrote, the Act has been amended (and 
interpreted) in ways that have made it much more discretionary and flexible than it was as 
originally implemented. See Jamison E. Colburn, Canus (Wolf) and Ursus (Grizzly) Recovery: 
Taking the Measure of an Eroding Statute, 22(2) NAT. RES. & ENV‘T 22 (2007). But the ESA is 
still routinely characterized as a rigid, prohibitory law.  
 43. Besides the library of plans, policies, guidelines, and manuals on ESA practice, see, 
e.g., Consultation Handbook (1998), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/consult 
ations/s7hndbk/s7hndbk.htm, and the Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook (1996), 
available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/hcp/hcpbook.html, the Services have an equally 
well-developed body of such materials on the management of wildlife refuges. See Robert L. 
Fischman, From Words to Action: The Impact and Legal Status of the 2006 National Wildlife 
Refuge System Management Policies, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 77 (2007). 
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by agency personnel though never codified in the CFR, is what 
structures the statute‘s implementation. Indeed, they structure how 
section 4‘s listing factors44 are weighed and compared,45 how relevant 
biological entities are identified,
46
 how available information is 
gathered and assessed gauging the threats facing these entities,
47
 and 
how the conservation efforts already in place are evaluated.
48
 None of 
 
 44. The five listing factors in ESA section 4(a)(1)(A)–(E) are well known and oft-cited. 
Less well known, however, are the ―bas[e]s for determinations‖ set out in ESA section 4(b)(1) 
for listing and ESA section 4(b)(2) for critical habitat designations. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)–
(2). There, the Act requires that the Services:  
shall make determinations . . . solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial 
data available . . . after conducting a review of the status of the species and after taking 
into account those efforts, if any, being made by any State or foreign nation, or any 
political subdivision of a State or foreign nation, to protect such species, whether by 
predator control, protection of habitat and food supply, or other conservation 
practices, within any area under its jurisdiction. 
Id. (emphasis added). This mandate that other jurisdictions‘ ―efforts‖ and ―conservation 
practices‖ be taken ―into account‖ complicates the Services‘ decision making substantially. See 
infra note 106 and accompanying text.  
 45. Beginning with a draft and then a finalized set of ―listing priority guidelines‖ in 1983, 
the Fish and Wildlife Service (―FWS‖) has used a factored matrix to balance taxonomic 
distinctness, magnitude of threat, and immediacy of threat in its listing decisions. See Fish and 
Wildlife Service, Notice: Draft Endangered and Threatened Species Listing and Recovery 
Priority Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 16,756 (Apr. 19, 1983); Fish and Wildlife Service, Notice: 
Final Endangered and Threatened Species Listing and Recovery Priority Guidelines, 48 Fed. 
Reg. 43,098 (Sept. 21, 1983).  
 Taxa that receive low priority numbers on this matrix usually are consigned to ―candidate‖ 
status behind other, higher priority taxa to be listed more quickly. See, e.g., Defenders of 
Wildlife et al. v. Norton, 239 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2002) (challenge to FWS finding that 
Canada lynx‘s listing was ―warranted but precluded‖ by higher priority candidates for listing). 
In the event that such a prioritization is successfully changed as a result of judicial action, see 
id. at 22–24, taxa can be listed ahead of other priorities the Services deem more urgent—but the 
Services maintain that prioritization is required by ESA section 4(h)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(h)(3). 
This has led to a ‗governance by lawsuit‘ mentality within FWS and in the public‘s perception 
of its programs. See, e.g., Katrina Myriam Wyman, Rethinking the ESA to Reflect Human 
Dominion over Nature, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 490, 496 & n.30 (2008). 
 46. See Notice, Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate Population 
Segments Under the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722 (Feb. 7, 1996) [hereinafter 
DPS Policy]; Notice, Policy Applying the Definition of Species Under the Endangered Species 
Act to Pacific Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612 (Nov. 20, 1991) [hereinafter ESU Policy].  
 47. See Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for Peer Review in Endangered Species 
Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,270 (July 1, 1994) [hereinafter Peer Review Policy]; Notice of 
Interagency Cooperative Policy on Information Standards Under the Endangered Species Act, 
59 Fed. Reg. 34,271 (July 1, 1994) [hereinafter ―Information Standards‖ Policy]. 
 48. See Notice, Policy for Evaluation of Conservation Efforts When Making Listing 
Decisions, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,100 (Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter ―PECE‖]. 
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these policies has ever been codified. Most of these have also been 
published in the Federal Register, but only in the form of a 
―notice.‖49 And each is routinely followed as if it were law, raising 
some troubling questions about the normativity of the judgments they 
embody and convey. If an agency action creates law, fully authorized 
and in lockstep with authority delegated by Congress, then virtually 
complete deference is warranted—absent constitutional issues—
when and if that action is reviewed in court.
50
 Administrative law has 
been unsettled at least since United States v. Mead Corp.
51
 as to when 
agency interpretations are law in this sense, though.
52
  
As the tempo of ESA litigation has quickened, these puzzles have 
grown more urgent. For example, in a remarkable opinion—which 
now constitutes binding circuit precedent reversible only en banc or 
by the Supreme Court—the Ninth Circuit held that the Services‘ 
―Distinct Population Segment‖ (―DPS‖) policy possesses sufficient 
force of law to be due Chevron-style judicial deference and that that 
level of deference is enough to shut down even meritorious 
challenges to the agencies‘ interpretations of the Act‘s ―species‖ 
concept.
53
 The holding was made all the more remarkable by the fact 
that the Ninth Circuit, like other courts, now routinely sets aside 
agency factual findings and conclusions of law on particular listing 
 
 49. The Federal Register cannot publish any document ―unless it is the official action of 
the agency concerned,‖ 1 C.F.R. § 5.4(c) (2008), but the publication category of ―notices‖ 
includes any and all ―miscellaneous documents applicable to the public . . . and other 
information of public interest‖ which are not Presidential documents, rules and regulations, or 
proposed rules. Id. § 5.9. 
 50. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424–26 & n.9 (1977); Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Ros. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864–66 (1984). To the extent agencies 
and courts are agents whose actions reflect their considered judgments, this kind of deference is 
tantamount to rule-following, thereby making the rule-follower obedient to the rule-maker. And 
establishing authoritative sources and the rules they make is arguably the core of law‘s purpose 
or point. See generally JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 16–48 (Oxford 1990) 
(1975) (linking this theory of law as a matter of rules to a more general theory of practical 
reason).  
 51. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
 52. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 
(2001); Michael Herz, Judicial Review of Statutory Issues Outside of the Chevron Doctrine, in 
A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 125 (John F. Duffy & 
Michael Herz eds., 2005). 
 53. See Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1140–43 
(9th Cir. 2007).  
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decisions made pursuant to the DPS Policy.
54
 Thus, the DPS policy 
and the conservation planning it orchestrates have lately become a 
matter of substantial conflict, intensely questioned agency judgments, 
and vague, indeterminate legal standards that can either immunize the 
agency or expose it to rigorous judicial review depending on the 
timing and format of the challenges.
55
  
Other policies and the agency interpretations they embody are 
perhaps turning in this direction as well.
56
 If they are, it is a mixed 
blessing at best for conservation, because it signals to the 
bureaucracies involved that they should establish their policies and 
judgments in a non-standard rule form that cannot be challenged as 
such
57
 and is neither fully nor easily recognizable as such.
58
 
Agencies, of course, often wish to protect themselves against legal 
challenges involving the controversial judgments they must make. 
Yet, together with the internal staff-to-staff communications that 
constitute the agencies‘ working flows, these policies now exert 
formative influences on conservation as carried out by the federal 
 
 54. See, e.g., Nat‘l Ass‘n of Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2003); 
National Wildlife Federation v. Norton, 386 F. Supp. 2d 553 (D. Vt. 2005); Humane Soc‘y of 
the U.S. v. Kempthorne, 579 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 55. See, e.g., Cook Inlet Beluga Whale v. Daley, 156 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2001); 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001); Nat‘l Assn. of Home Builders, 
340 F.3d at 835; Nat‘l Wildlife Fed‘n., 386 F. Supp. 2d at 553; Humane Soc‘y of U.S., 579 F. 
Supp. 2d at 7; Cal. State Grange v. Nat‘l Marine Fisheries Serv., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 
(E.D.Cal. 2008); see also Doremus, infra note 63; Ruhl, supra note 9 at; Daniel J. Rohlf, 
There’s Something Fishy Going on Here: A Critique of the National Marine Fisheries Service's 
Definition of Species under the Endangered Species Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 617 (1994). 
 56. Recovery plans under ESA section 4(f), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f), are denominated in the 
Act as a ―plan‖ requiring ―public notice and opportunity for public review and comment.‖ Id. 
§ 1533(f)(4). Elsewhere, these plans, and indeed the concept of ―recovery,‖ are virtually 
missing from the text of the statute—although FWS guidance on and attitudes toward recovery 
planning have tended to confirm the importance of the plans once written. See, e.g., Fund for 
Animals v. Babbitt, 967 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1997) (rejecting challenge to a plan designating 
population targets for Grizzly bear that argued plan was too fixed and result-oriented given the 
state of scientific knowledge). 
 57. Unlike many of the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court has lately taken a 
decidedly more skeptical view of so-called pre-enforcement review challenges to rules and 
rulemaking proceedings. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009); Ohio 
Forestry Ass‘n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998). 
 58. See generally Sam Kalen, The Transformation of Modern Administrative Law: 
Changing Administrative and Environmental Guidance Documents, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 101 
(2009). 
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government. They are becoming entrenched in the Services‘ culture 
and cognition.  
As normative mechanisms which may be authoritative, 
prescriptive, and preemptive to greater or lesser degrees, ESA section 
4‘s ―guidelines‖ and ―plans‖ are growing in practical importance as 
well. Clearly, the agencies are following these ―rules‖ (in the sense of 
that term set out in the Administrative Procedure Act) in too many 
ways to count.
59
 And so are reviewing courts—sometimes. And this 
just deepens the curiosity. In Batterton v. Francis,
60
 the Supreme 
Court contrasted the universe of ―administrative interpretations of 
statutory terms,‖ which it said were ―given important, but not 
controlling, significance,‖ as against ―regulations with legislative 
effect,‖ which it said a ―reviewing court is not free to set aside . . . 
simply because it would have interpreted the statute in a different 
manner.‖61 Taking that as a benchmark, where do the guidelines, 
policies, and plans of the ESA fall on our spectrum of legal norms? 
The challenge going forward is at least as much about how courts and 
other legal actors answer this question—how they recognize and 
interpret such agency norms—as it is about anything else in the law 
of conservation. And the intersection of this question with the forms 
of practical reason in conservation more generally (whether 
qualitative or quantitative) will be one of the most active crossroads 
in the coming decades. Part II uses the saga of the Canada lynx to 
explore the resource constraints of ESA practice today. 
II. MORE ART THAN SCIENCE: THE ESA AT THIRTY-FIVE AND 
COUNTING 
As conservation‘s flagship, the ESA is often revered and reviled 
for the very same attributes. Part II argues, however, that it is failing 
structurally the further we move into our quantitative age.  
 
 59. See, e.g., LAWRENCE R. LIEBESMAN & RAFE PETERSEN, ENDANGERED SPECIES 
DESKBOOK 223–616 (2d ed. 2010) (collecting policies, guidance, and manual provisions 
currently in force). 
 60. 432 U.S. 416 (1977). 
 61. Id. at 424–25. 
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A. Repeal by Starvation? Feeding and Caring for Your Pit Bull
62
 
The ESA has long been revered for its powerful bite while at the 
same time being faulted for its genetic predispositions. Apart from 
the fact that what it protects in nature is, by necessity, exceptional, 
ESA actions have proven to be too deliberate and contentious, too 
sequential, and too fixated on the parts of nature already in 
jeopardy.
63
 The statute screens its agents‘ ―actions‖ through legal 
processes that are arduous, routinized, and costly—leaving its 
administrators to face some rather perverse incentives. The reward 
for plowing through all the listing petitions and backlogged 
protections for at-risk taxa is more of the same: triage, scarcity, and 
conflict.
64
 Looking ahead, this vortex threatens to consume more and 
more resources without ever reaching the root causes of the 
environmental degradations at issue, and that is a tragedy in the 
making.
65
  
One focal point in this confusion of means and ends has been the 
periodic ritual known as the ―Candidate Notice of Review‖ 
(―CNOR‖).66 From 1975 to 1996, FWS periodically published an 
aggregative list of taxa that ―should be taken into account in 
environmental planning,‖67—lists of taxa, in other words, that were 
―at risk‖ in some general sense.68 Since 1996, however, ―candidates‖ 
have been only those taxa for which the Services have ―on file 
 
 62. See George Cameron Coggins, An Ivory Tower Perspective on Endangered Species 
Law, 8 NAT. RES. & ENV‘T 3, 3 (1993) (calling ESA a ―pit bull‖ of a law). 
 63. ―It is widely agreed that the inability to provide protection before the late stages of 
decline is a serious failing of the ESA.‖ Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of 
the Endangered Species Act’s Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 404 (2004). 
 64. See, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, The Sixth Extinction?, THE NEW YORKER, May 25, 2009, 
at 53. 
 65. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to 
the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 32–42 (2008). 
 66. See, e.g., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Notice: Review of Native Species that Are 
Candidates for Listing as Endangered or Threatened, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,804 (2009). 
 67. Review of Vertebrate Wildlife for Listing as Endangered or Threatened Species, 47 
Fed. Reg. 58,454, 58,454 (Fish & Wildlife Serv., Dept. of Interior Dec. 30, 1982). 
 68. See Notice of Final Decision on Identification of Candidates for Listing as 
Endangered or Threatened, 61 Fed. Reg. 64,481, 64,481 (1996) (―[FWS] has decided that . . . 
[f]uture lists of species that are candidates for listing under the [ESA] will be restricted to those 
species for which the Service has on file sufficient information to support issuance of a 
proposed listing rule.‖). 
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sufficient information on biological vulnerability and threats to 
support a proposal to list as endangered or threatened but for which 
preparation and publication of a proposal is precluded by higher 
priority listing actions.‖69 In December 2008, this list numbered 
251.
70
 The move in 1996 refined FWS‘s approach to candidate status, 
and it now maintains that taxa may be added to its candidate list 
―based on an evaluation of . . . status that [they] have conducted on 
[their] own initiative, or as a result of making a finding on a petition 
to list . . . that listing is warranted but precluded by other higher 
priority listing action.‖71 Confusingly enough, the Fisheries Service 
still takes the broader approach to ―candidate‖ identification.72 
The structure and function of the ―candidacy‖ threshold are 
critical for several reasons. First, it sharpens the focus down to those 
forms of ecological disturbance that measurably threaten ESA-
relevant biological entities. As we have seen most recently with the 
listing of the Polar bear and the related upset of the ESA section 7 
consultation rules,
73
 the zoning of risks within or beyond the 
Services‘ scope of operations is increasingly fully decisive of ESA 
choices.
74
 Second, there are many more biological entities in peril 
 
 69. Part 424 defines ―candidates‖ as ―any species being considered by the Secretary for 
listing . . . but not yet the subject of a proposed rule.‖ 50 C.F.R. § 424.02(b). See, e.g., Review 
of Plant and Animal Species That Are Candidates or Proposed for Listing as Endangered or 
Threatened, Annual Notice of Findings on Recycled Petitions, and Annual Description of 
Progress on Listing Actions, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,808 (2001). The adoption of this criterion for 
―candidate‖ status in 1996 joined the internal and petition processes for purposes of 
prioritization and required findings under the ESA. See Notice of Final Decision on 
Identification of Candidates for Listing as Endangered or Threatened, 61 Fed. Reg. 64,481 
(1996). Of course, it is only an informal ―guideline‖ that sets out the priorities in listing. See 
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Endangered and Threatened Species Listing and Recovery Priority 
Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 43, 098, 43, 102 (1983). 
 70. See Review of Plant and Animal Species That Are Candidates or Proposed for Listing 
as Endangered or Threatened, Annual Notice of Findings on Recycled Petitions, and Annual 
Description of Progress on Listing Actions, 73 Fed. Reg. 75,176, 75,177 (2008). Another fifty 
taxa had pending listing proposals. Id. 
 71. Id. at 75,176. 
 72. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Establishment of Species of Concern 
List, 69 Fed. Reg. 19,975 (Nat‘l Marine Fisheries Serv., Nat‘l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., 
Dept. of Commerce Apr. 15, 2004). 
 73. See infra notes 178–209 and accompanying text. 
 74. See Eric Biber & Cynthia Drew, Stopping the Conservation: Amended ESA Section 7 
Regulations Put Species at Risk, 36 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 139 (2009), http://elq.typepad.com/ 
currents/pdf/currents36-01-biber-2009-0122-pdf. 
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today than can possibly be listed and managed as such.
75
 Finally, as a 
practical matter, petitioning the Services to list more and more taxa 
each fiscal year
76
 is simply exhausting the appropriations Congress 
sees fit to provide and indirectly hastening the use of fiscal levers 
(budgetary processes being the most politically opaque of all
77
) to 
hide from public view what the ―median legislator‖ might wish to 
avoid doing publicly.
78
 
Now, as to taxa brought to the Services‘ attention by private 
petition, ESA section 4(b)(3)(C) expressly requires a defined 
―warranted-but-precluded‖ finding that is subject to separate judicial 
review should the Services conclude that the species is simply not 
significant enough to add to the federal lists.
79
 It also requires that 
any such finding be reviewed by the agency at least every twelve 
months—establishing a rather paradoxical status quo for many 
species.
80
 Being kept off the list of protected species represents a 
 
 75. See, e.g., T.M. Brooks et al., Global Biodiversity Conservation Priorities, 313 
SCIENCE 58 (July 7, 2006). 
 76. ESA section 4 provides that ―to the maximum extent practicable, within 90 days after 
receiving [a listing petition from an ―interested person‖] under [the APA‘s rulemaking petition 
process] to add a species to, or to remove a species from‖ the endangered or threatened lists, the 
Services ―shall make a finding as to whether the petition presents substantial scientific or 
commercial information indicating that petitioned action may be warranted.‖ 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(b)(3). This ninety-day petition clock, together with the restrictions on information that 
may be used in assessing such petitions, has bound the Services into a series of decision-making 
―tunnels.‖ See infra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 77. See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 2–4 (rev. ed. 
2000) (attributing the opacity of the budget process to its immense complexity, high stakes, and 
uncertain procedural norms). 
 78. See infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 79. See, e.g., Friends of the Wild Swan v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 945 F. Supp. 
1388, 1396–1400 (D. Or. 1996); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 254 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 
2001); Am. Lands Alliance v. Norton, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2003); Sierra Forest Prods., 
Inc. v. Kempthorne, 2008 WL 2384047 (E.D. Cal. 2008). All three of these courts concluded 
that ESA section 4(b)(3)(C)‘s requirement of a separate, identifiable ―warranted-but-precluded‖ 
finding entails a finding of sufficient particularity and detail as to enable effective judicial 
review in accordance with the principles of State Farm. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 80. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(C) (2000). The 1982 Amendments to section 4, which 
completely overhauled the listing and petition procedures the Secretary must observe, seem to 
have confused the agencies on taxa for which they possess sufficient information to make an 
affirmative listing factor finding and taxa for which a valid and substantial petition has been 
filed under section 4(b)(3) but which the Services elect to deny. See 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii) (2000); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 254 F.3d at 838. After several 
litigated cases, the plain text of section 4(b)(3)(B)—requiring a separate finding be published 
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uniquely qualitative judgment, and it has in recent memory provoked 
important litigation and cultural conflict.
81
 Now, to be sure, 
warranted-but-precluded candidates are not wholly outside the ESA‘s 
influence. In a growing number of cases, the Services have used this 
―candidate‖ finding to spur others into action, a conservation practice 
I will outline below in Part IV.  
Of course, as tragic as this ―waiting room‖ may seem, the Act 
itself anticipates it.
82
 Indeed, Congress and the President together 
have quietly jammed it full by depriving the ESA of the resources it 
could now easily consume. When confronted, appropriations 
decision-makers say they are merely preventing the ESA from 
dominating all other public and private business with their 
appropriations levers.
83
 And many struggles today are over the 
relative priorities assigned to particular candidates—struggles the 
Services often lose when they get to court.
84
 Yet, because the listing 
processes are bound by the Anti-Deficiency Act
85
 and because of 
annual appropriations caps Congress has placed on the listing 
program specifically, including sub-caps on the critical habitat 
 
outlining the agency‘s conclusions that other, higher priorities precluded listing the petitioned-
for candidate—became manifest. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 466 F.3d 
1098 (9th Cir. 2006).  
 81. The Polar bear listing saga, both as a matter of litigation and for its role in the social 
and political upheaval surrounding U.S. attitudes toward climate change, is discussed below. 
See infra notes 178–209 and accompanying text; see also Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt, 
146 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998).  
 82. ESA section 4(b)(3)(B)(i) empowers the Secretary to find that:  
[t]he petitioned action is warranted, but that— 
(I) the immediate proposal and timely promulgation of a final regulation implementing 
the petitioned action . . . is precluded by pending proposals to determine whether any 
species is an endangered species or a threatened species, and 
(II) expeditious progress is being made to add qualified species to either of the lists . . . 
and to remove from such lists species for which the protections of this chapter are no 
longer necessary. 
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii) (2000).  
 83. See, e.g., Katrina Miriam Wyman, Rethinking the ESA to Reflect Human Dominion 
over Nature, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 490, 496–97 & n.30 (2008). 
 84. See, e.g., California Native Plant Soc. v. Norton, 2005 WL 768444 (D.D.C. 2005); 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 466 F.3d at 1098; Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. 
Kempthorne, 2008 WL 205253 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
 85. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (2004). 
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program,
86
 the notices of ―review‖ have become periodic reminders 
of our true predicament: the ESA‘s operability is becoming an 
accident of timing and litigation, which now drive the fates of 
specific taxa and habitat.
87
 In short, its scale and scope are becoming 
functions of the scarcity of public investment in conservation. So the 
CNOR ritual should prove at least this much: the ESA is now about 
caged, muzzled power as much or more than it is about the damage it 
causes when finally unleashed. Part II.B illustrates with an example: 
the Canada lynx. 
B. Mesocarnivores and Landscape Scale Conservation 
Carnivores in general and mid-level carnivores in particular 
routinely populate lists of Earth‘s most at-risk taxa.88 The Canada 
lynx, a medium-sized forest carnivore, is perhaps the ESA‘s richest 
case study in the accidents of timing, taxonomy, and threat 
assessment. First identified by FWS as a candidate for listing in 
1982,
89
 the lynx was and remains relatively abundant throughout the 
boreal forests of Canada and Alaska.
90
 In the contiguous United 
States, however, its abundance has been much more uneven.
91
 
 
 86. See Review of Vertebrate Wildlife for Listing as Endangered or Threatened Species, 
73 Fed. Reg. at 75,185 (proposed Dec. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
 87. Reviewing courts themselves recognize this. One of the first reported cases in which a 
court reversed a warranted-but-precluded finding noted the ―obscurity and indeterminacy in the 
ranking process‖ and how ―a species‘ priority level effectively determines whether or not it is 
listed under the ESA.‖ Friends of the Wild Swan, 945 F. Supp. at 1391. At that point (FY ‘94), 
FWS was still listing candidates with ranking priorities as low as ―6‖ on their twelve point 
scale. Id. In its 2008 CNOR, FWS explained that not even a listing priority ranking of ―2‖ any 
longer assured the taxa of a high enough priority for listing. See Review of Vertebrate Wildlife 
for Listing as Endangered or Threatened Species, 73 Fed Reg. at 75186 (proposed Dec. 10, 
2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt 17). Commentary now routinely spotlights the influence of 
budgetary starvation. See, e.g., Wyman, supra note 45, at 495–99.  
 88. See, e.g., K. Ullas Karanth & Ravi Chellam, Carnivore Conservation at the 
Crossroads, 43 ORYX 1 (2009). 
 89. See Review of Vertebrate Wildlife for Listing as Endangered or Threatened Species, 
47 Fed. Reg. 58,454, 58,460 (proposed Dec. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
 90. See James K. Agee, Disturbance Ecology of North American Boreal Forests and 
Associated Northern Mixed/Subalpine Forests, in ECOLOGY AND CONSERVATION OF LYNX IN 
THE UNITED STATES 39, 39–47 (Leonard F. Ruggiero et al. eds., 2000). 
 91. See Kevin S. McKelvey et al., History and Distribution of Lynx in the Contiguous 
United States, in ECOLOGY AND CONSERVATION OF LYNX IN THE UNITED STATES 207 (Leonard 
F. Ruggiero et al. eds., 2000).  
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Reliable data record the lynx‘s occurrence in twenty-four states going 
back to at least the mid-1800s.
92
 Lynx occurrence is closely 
associated with conifer forest types, especially those comprising the 
southern, alpine extensions of the boreal forest.
93
 Lynx are also 
thought to vary in abundance according to the cyclical expansion and 
contraction of their foremost prey, the snowshoe hare,
94
 although that 
relationship is much more explicit in the northern parts of their range 
than it is in the southern parts.
95
 The lynx remained a low priority for 
FWS until it was the subject of a petition and then a lawsuit by a 
collection of wildlife organizations beginning in late 1992.
96
 At the 
same time this was going on, FWS was developing its policy on the 
criteria for ―distinct population segments,‖ a taxonomic category the 
Act recognizes but which biology does not.
97
 After the suits resulted 
in remands to the agency for reconsideration in 1997,
98
 and again in 
2002,
99
 the lynx population of the contiguous United States was 
finally listed as a ―threatened‖ DPS through a ―clarification of 
 
 92. Id. at 253. Confusions with bobcats render most data prior to the mid-1800s suspect. 
Id.  
 93. McKelvey et al., supra note 91, at 253. 
 94. Cf. Clayton D. Apps, Space-Use, Diet, Demographics, and Topographic Associations 
of Lynx in the Southern Canadian Rocky Mountains: A Study, in ECOLOGY AND 
CONSERVATION OF LYNX IN THE UNITED STATES 351, 352 (Leonard F. Ruggiero et al. eds., 
2000) (offering evidence that is mildly supportive of the conventional wisdom about lynx and 
hare population synchronies).  
 95. Id. at 352–53. 
 96. See 12-Month Finding for a Petition to List As Endangered or Threatened the 
Contiguous United States Population of the Canada Lynx, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,507 (1994) 
(proposed Dec. 27, 1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt 17) (finding listing not warranted); 12-
Month Finding for a Petition to List the Contiguous United States Population of the Canada 
Lynx, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,507 (proposed May 27, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) 
(finding listing warranted but precluded under FWS listing priority guidelines). 
 97. ESA section 3, in defining ―species,‖ includes species, subspecies, and ―distinct 
population segment[s] of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife.‖ 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) 
(2000). The interpretation of this term in the Act was the subject of great uncertainty and debate 
within the listing agencies. See Maine v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 357, 377–79 (D. Me. 2003). It 
was not until 1996—almost twenty years after the Act was amended to include the term—that 
the Services adopted a joint policy setting out their ―principles‖ for recognizing and, where 
appropriate, listing DPS‘s. See Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate 
Segments under the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722 (Feb. 7, 1996). 
 98. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 958 F. Supp. 670 (D.D.C. 1997) [hereinafter 
―Lynx I] (remanding ―warranted-but-precluded‖ finding). 
 99. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 9. 
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findings‖ FWS published in 2003.100 Without the petition and without 
the litigation, the lynx almost certainly would have remained in the 
waiting room to this day.
101
 
Key to establishing the lynx in the lower forty-eight states as an 
ESA-relevant biological entity was the use of the DPS concept
102
 and, 
specifically, the presence of an ―international boundary‖ bisecting the 
range of the populations at issue. Indeed, the U.S./Canadian border is 
what made the lynx DPS into a taxon even possibly meeting ESA 
section 4‘s listing criteria. Without it, the lynx populations resident in 
the contiguous United States just look like the southern-most edges of 
a relatively healthy metapopulation centered in northwestern 
Canada.
103
 The Services maintain in their DPS Policy, and in their 
applications of it since 1996, that international boundaries dividing a 
taxon may factor into the ―discreteness‖ or the distinctness of a 
population segment because international boundaries create 
―differences in control of exploitation, management of habitat, 
conservation status, or regulatory mechanisms.‖104 Yet, ESA section 
 
 100. See Notice of Remanded Determination of Status for the Contiguous United States 
Distinct Population Segment of the Canada Lynx, 68 Fed. Reg. 40,076 (proposed July 3, 2003) 
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). In the 2003 findings, FWS listed the population as 
persisting in, or potentially being restored to, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming, and all other states with documented occurrences of lynx (Connecticut, Indiana, 
Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and 
Virginia) as having only ever supported dispersers and/or as being presently ―extirpated.‖ See 
id. at 40,080. Pennsylvania was later deleted as having been included erroneously. 
 101. Prior to the decision in Lynx I, FWS characterized the threats to the lynx population(s) 
in the contiguous United States as both ―imminent‖ and of ―high‖ magnitude. See 62 Fed. Reg. 
at 28,657. The relatively low listing priority was the result of its taxonomic status—because it 
was neither a monotypic genus nor a proper ―species.‖ Id. at 28,657; cf. Listing Priority 
Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. at 43,103. 
 102. FWS‘s ―DPS‖ concept is quite similar to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration‘s ―evolutionarily significant unit‖ concept for salmonid management. See 
Policy on Applying the Definition of Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 56 Fed. Reg. 
58,612 (1991). With each, the agencies have committed themselves to recognizing and listing 
biological entities that are spatially, temporally, and/or genetically segregable from their wider 
taxa—but only insofar as those entities are ―significant‖ to their biological species or subspecies 
(an approach some criticize) and are themselves at risk according to section 4(a)‘s listing 
factors. 
 103. Cf. Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 18–21 (D.D.C. 2002) (rejecting 
FWS finding that losses of range within the contiguous U.S. were not ―significant‖ because 
they were merely the dispersers from Canada).  
 104. 61 Fed. Reg. at 4725. 
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4 undermines that very interpretation. Listing factor (D), ―the 
inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms‖ (the factor to which 
they attribute this criterion of discreteness), easily could justify the 
use of state and local boundaries in identifying taxa as well—
something the Services have repeatedly (though cryptically) refused 
to do.
105
 Indeed, it would make good practical sense to interpret 
section 4 as linking listing determinations rather directly to the 
strengths and weaknesses of existing ―conservation practices.‖106 
Thus, the naked assertion that the Act ought to be implemented 
without regard to local or state treatment of a taxon is neither a matter 
of agency expertise,
107
 nor a matter of clearly expressed 
congressional intent,
108
 nor even all that consistent with the Services‘ 
actions elsewhere.
109
 In reality, state, local, and private authorities 
 
 105. 61 Fed. Reg. at 4724 (―Recognition of other political boundaries, such as State lines 
within the United States, would appear to lead to the recognition of entities that are primarily of 
conservation interest at the State and local level, and inappropriate as a focus for a national 
program.‖); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Norton, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (FWS‘s designated gray 
wolf DPS was structured without regard to state lines and defended on those grounds). Most 
often, the agencies repeat an expressed hope of the Senate Committee on Environment and 
Public Works (which added the DPS language to the species definition in 1978) that DPS‘s be 
established ―sparingly‖ and with great caution. See, e.g., Cal. State Grange v. Nat’l Marine 
Fisheries Serv., at *50–54.  
 106. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2); see supra note 44. 
 107. The courts seem fully engaged in assessing the agencies‘ ―discreteness‖ judgments 
according to the DPS Policy and have refused to simply accept, whatever the evidence or 
argument, a bald assertion as to the ―significance‖ of a discrete/distinct population. See, e.g., 
Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Norton, 340 F.3d at 844–50 (invalidating listing of DPS 
because, apart from labeling the population within the United States ―significant,‖ FWS did not 
explain its significance to its wider taxon). 
 108. The absolute weakest form of legislative history—that printed by a committee after 
enactment of the subject legislation—is where the agencies have claimed to find Congress‘s 
expressed hope that they list populations not essential to their wider taxa only when the taxa are 
mostly outside the United States and the imperiled populations are within it. See 61 Fed. Reg. 
4725; Maine v. Norton, 257 F. Supp. 2d 357, 383 (D. Me. 2003). The report in question, Senate 
Report 96-151, published in connection with the 1979 amendments, denominated its discussion 
of listing discrete ―populations‖ an ―other point‖ that did ―not warrant amendments to the law,‖ 
but rather just ―some clarification‖ in the form of legislative dicta. Endangered Species Act 
Authorizations, S. Rep. No. 96-151, reprinted in COMM. ON ENV‘T AND PUB. WORKS, 97TH 
CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 at 1391, 
1397 (1982). 
 109. The agencies‘ use of ―existing conservation efforts,‖ for example, constantly 
incorporates state and/or local conservation priorities as factors in listing determinations. See 
Kristen Uchitel, PECE and Cooperative Conservation: Innovation or Subversion under the 
Endangered Species Act, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 233 (2006). The fact that this 
―consideration‖ appears in ESA section 4(b) under ―basis for determinations‖ and not in ESA 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
258 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 32:237 
 
 
exert powerful influences over the conservation and restoration of at-
risk taxa. State and local boundaries are, in this connection, highly 
salient. For example, as the gray wolf delisting saga has 
demonstrated, if taxa are going to be identified at listing using state-
by-state records of historic occurrence, the Services inevitably will 
confront the variation in state and local conservation policies when 
and if they find their DPS(s) ―recovered‖ to the point that a status 
change is warranted.
110
 In short, the Services‘ reasons for ignoring 
subnational legal boundaries while responding to international 
boundaries are either weak or, as yet, unspecified. 
All of that matters because the conservation of Canada lynx is 
now scaling down as FWS and the federal land management bureaus 
grapple with the designation and management of the lynx‘s ―critical 
habitat.‖111 Delayed for years while FWS addressed its massive 
critical habitat backlog, the Service eventually finalized a 
determination in 2006.
112
 Within the ―specific areas‖ occupied by the 
lynx DPS at listing, the critical habitat designation of 2006 excluded 
all but a tiny fraction of the lands within the DPS‘s range.113 As 
 
section 4(a)(1), under listing determinations ―generally,‖ has never been explained or 
authoritatively interpreted by the agencies, to my knowledge.  
 110. See Fish and Wildlife Serv., Final Rule to Identify the Northern Rocky Mountain 
Population of Gray Wolf as a Distinct Population Segment and to Revise the List of 
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 74 Fed. Reg. 15,123 (Apr. 2, 2009). 
 111. Most recently, the agency finalized an amended critical habitat rule for the lynx which 
took specific notice of new information on the likely effects of climate change upon lynx 
habitat in the contiguous United States. See Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for the 
Contiguous United States Distinct Population Segment of the Canada Lynx, 74 Fed. Reg. 8616, 
8617 (Feb. 25, 2009). See infra notes 115, 121 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Designation of Critical Habitat for the Contiguous United States Distinct 
Population Segment of the Canada Lynx, 71 Fed. Reg. 66,008 (Nov. 9, 2006). 
 113. See id. at 66,028–31. The exclusions were justified by various forms of deference to 
other land and habitat conservation arrangements, including Land and Resource Management 
Plans governing National Forest System lands under the National Forest Management Act, 
private landowner commitments, and state and local land use plans and restrictions. See id. at 
66,030–51. A cryptic statement in connection with the economic analysis of the designation 
made it unclear precisely why FWS was making the exclusions. See id. at 66,052 (―[W]e 
evaluated the benefits of conservation programs, plans, and partnerships relative to the 
regulatory benefits of critical habitat. . . . As a result, we are only finalizing critical habitat for 
the lynx lands [in three national parks not governed by those other mechanisms].‖). ESA 
section 4(b)(2) allows that FWS ―may exclude any area from critical habitat if [it] determines 
that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of the 
critical habitat. . . .‖ 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). If FWS made its finding in the 2006 rule on the 
basis of a ―draft economic analysis‖ that was never finalized, however, it did so only impliedly 
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things turned out, this action was one of many tainted by the 
involvement of disgraced Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior 
Laurie McDonald.
114
 FWS reissued the finding following 
McDonald‘s departure, greatly expanding it.115 The revised 
designation included all ―areas occupied by the species that currently 
contain the physical and biological features essential to the 
conservation of the lynx.‖116 These include areas with the presence of 
snowshoe hare, denning sites (coarse woody debris or rock 
formations), and/or what FWS refers to as ―matrix habitats‖—patchy 
forests of different vegetative and geologic types.
117
 In short, the 
mixture is the measure: lynx habitat needs are a rather unpredictable 
amalgam of the boreal and alpine environments in which they 
evolved.
118
 
For many, this lynx critical habitat designation represents a 
powerful lever in the struggle against cultivated forests, mining, 
motorized recreation, sprawl, and other choice land uses.
119
 But 
notice how localized those struggles are and will remain—and how 
unlikely it is that they will be resolved by the (arduous, costly, 
divisive, and legally confined) act of critical habitat designation for 
 
in the quoted statement above and almost certainly opened itself to the charge that it obscured 
the grounds of its decisions. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972); United 
States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 114. Throughout her tenure, McDonald allegedly took dozens of questionable and/or 
obviously inappropriate steps to obstruct conservation programs throughout the Department of 
Interior. See U.S. Dept. of Interior, Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Julie 
MacDonald, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Fish, Wildlife & Parks (copy on file with author); 
Before the H. Comm. on Natural Res. (2008) (statement of Robin M. Nazzarro, Director of 
Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office) [hereinafter 
Nazzarro Testimony].  
 115. See Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for the Contiguous United States Distinct 
Population Segment of the Canada Lynx, 74 Fed. Reg. 8616.  
 116. Id. at 8617. ―Area of occupation‖ and at what historical baseline are two perennial 
sources of dispute in ESA section 4 decision making. In the case of the lynx, one of the alleged 
interferences by McDonald was her insistence that firm proof of occurrence be documented as 
of 1995—a criterion to which many objected (within and outside FWS) because it departed 
from the agency‘s past practices. 
 117. See id. at 8635–38. 
 118. William R. Rice, Speciation Via Habitat Specialization, 1(4) EVOL. ECOL. 301 (1987) 
(sorting and discussing evidence that genotype and phenotype interact as habitat demands). 
 119. See, e.g., Stephen C. Trombulak & Kimberly Royar, Restoring the Wild: Species 
Recovery and Reintroduction, in WILDERNESS COMES HOME: REWILDING THE NORTHEAST 157 
(Christopher McGrory Klyza ed., 2001).  
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the lynx. ―Critical habitat designation alone . . . does not require 
property owners to undertake affirmative actions to promote the 
recovery of the species.‖120 Indeed, FWS has long been convinced 
that ―in many instances, the benefit of critical habitat designation is 
low compared to the conservation benefit that can be achieved 
through conservation efforts or management plans, especially when 
the likelihood of a Federal action occurring is low.‖121 Yet, as many 
times as the Service has deemed the designation of critical habitat not 
worth it or not ―prudent,‖122 the courts still resist these judgments.123 
Lynx habitat is a paradigmatic case of the micro crosshatching the 
macro in conservation politics. The more we study this particular 
carnivore—and federal land managers have known for years that 
more and better information about lynx ecology and behavior are 
sorely needed
124—the more evident it becomes that a variety of forest 
types can support lynx, that the lynx‘s populational source and sink 
dynamics are complex because of the long distances it can disperse 
and the cyclicality of its reproduction, and that so-called early-
successional habitats (forests after logging, fire, or other 
disturbances) tend to advantage lynx, albeit not where later-
 
 120. 74 Fed. Reg. at 8646. 
 121. Id. at 8646. Virtually identical conclusions about the relative benefits of critical 
habitat designations appear in the revised designation for Peninsular bighorn, see Fish and 
Wildlife Service, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical 
Habitat for Peninsular Bighorn Sheep and Determination of a Distinct Population Segment of 
Desert Bighorn Sheep (Ovis canadensis nelsoni), 74 Fed. Reg. 17,288 (Apr. 14, 2009), and the 
revised designation for the Quino checkerspot butterfly, see Fish and Wildlife Service, 
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revised Designation of Critical Habitat for 
Quino Checkerspot Butterfly (Euphydryas editha quino), 74 Fed. Reg. 28,766, 28,806–22 (June 
17, 2009). 
 122. ESA section 4(a)(3) states that the Services shall ―to the maximum extent prudent and 
determinable,‖ designate critical habitat at the time of listing. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A). 
 123. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 444–46 (5th Cir. 
2001); Natural Res. Def. Council v. United States Dep‘t of Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 1125–27 
(9th Cir. 1997); Jumping Frog Research Inst. v. Babbitt, 1999 WL 1244149 (N.D. Cal. 1999); 
Conservation Council of Haw. v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1284–85 (D. Haw. 1998); Bldg. 
Indus. Ass‘n v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893, 905–06 (D.D.C. 1997). 
 124. Fifteen years ago, the Forest Service undertook a comprehensive review of four 
―forest carnivores‖: the American marten, the fisher, the lynx, and the wolverine. See Rocky 
Mountain Forest and Range Experiment Station, The Scientific Basis for Conserving Forest 
Carnivores: American Marten, Fisher, Lynx, and Wolverine in the Western United States 
(1994) (Technical Report RM-254). The study of lynx in that undertaking was noteworthy for 
the many ―research needs‖ that emerged from the analysis, underscoring how little the existing 
scientific information aided actual lynx management. See id. at 74–94. 
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successional habitats are completely absent.
125
 Now that the lynx 
DPS is a federally protected taxon, though, how much of a federal 
priority should it become? The Services‘ deployment of the DPS 
concept has been notoriously slippery,
126
 leaving us to wonder about 
their priorities. Of course, biologically, natural diversity is measured 
at many different levels: 
[T]he causal historical process of evolution operates on 
lineages. However, lineages exist at all levels of biological 
organization: genes, chromosomes, organisms, kin groups, 
tribes, etc., and the processes of evolution can at least 
potentially [a]ffect the entities which make up lineages at all of 
these levels. Thus, any lineage is a potential unit of 
evolution.
127
 
 So should our notion of ―critical habitat‖ or the official 
designations thereof change when it is a DPS—and not a proper 
―species‖—at issue?  
 
 125. See Angela K. Fuller et al., Winter Habitat Selection by Canada Lynx in Maine: Prey 
Abundance or Accessibility?, 71 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 1980 (2007). 
 126. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions under the Endangered Species Act: Why 
Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029 (1997); Benjamin Fenton, 
Home Builders v. Norton: The Role of International Boundaries under the Endangered Species 
Act, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 575 (2005); Katherine M. Hausrath, The Designation of “Distinct 
Population Segments” under the Endangered Species Act in Light of National Association of 
Homebuilders v. Norton, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 449 (2005); Kevin D. Hill, The Endangered 
Species Act: What Do We Mean by Species?, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFFS. L. REV. 239 (1993); David 
S. Pennock & Walter M. Dimmick, Critique of the Evolutionarily Significant Unit as a 
Definition for “Distinct Population Segments” under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 11 
CONSERV. BIO. 611 (1997); Kevin W. Grierson, Note, The Concept of Species and the 
Endangered Species Act, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 463 (1992); Andrew E. Wetzler, Note, The Ethical 
Underpinnings of the Endangered Species Act, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 154–67 (1993). This 
confusion stems in large part from the biological species concept itself. See Paul-Michael 
Agapow et al., The Impact of Species Concept on Biodiversity Studies, 79(2) Q. REV. BIO. 161, 
163 (2004) (―The BSC is simple, obvious, and ultimately flawed.‖). Of course, reproductively 
isolated populations are intuitively specific, and the BSC is also attractive to scientists because 
―proposed species boundaries are falsifiable by the natural (and substantial) production of 
fertile hybrids across them.‖ Id. at 162. But ―discerning potential reproductive barriers can be 
difficult, time-consuming, expensive, and fraught with error.‖ Id. at 163. Moreover, for all the 
species that do not reproduce sexually, the BSC is useless. Id. (―The BSC can illuminate only a 
small fragment of the Tree of Life.‖). 
 127. Christopher D. Horvath, Discussion: Phylogenetic Species Concept: Pluralism, 
Monism, and History, 12 BIO. & PHIL. 225, 229 (1997). 
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While the Service‘s considered judgment on the overall utility of 
designating critical habitat seems rooted in experience,
128
 if this is as 
definite and firm as it has sounded lately, it is unclear what role such 
a judgment should play in guiding subordinate officials who make the 
particular critical habitat findings like that in the lynx saga. The 
findings that shifted in the lynx‘s case, it bears mentioning, were not 
that a critical habitat designation could positively benefit lynx or that 
the designation itself might have significant social costs. The shifts 
came in the relative values assigned to those probabilities.
129
 It was 
the measurements that changed. 
Of course, at a minimum, the revised critical habitat designation—
which voided the extensive exclusions that had been made in the first 
(McDonald-tainted) designation
130—was a highly salient social 
signal.
131
 FWS boosted the total area of designation from roughly 
 
 128. See, e.g., Amy Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less Is More in 
the Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129 (2004) 
(tracing the evolution of the critical habitat program from a loosely structured decisional 
process to one governed by a vast array of factors and sometimes conflicting legal precedents). 
 129. Of course, we could easily dwell on how FWS would turn so dramatically from 
concluding that the benefits of exclusion outweighed those of inclusion to concluding the 
precise opposite across so much territory so rapidly. After all the speculation and 
recriminations, though, we are not likely to learn all that much that we did not know already. 
When the stakes are high—or at least seem high—political actors at the heads of agencies will 
insert themselves into otherwise routine decision-making processes, sometimes in sinister ways. 
Many have argued that this is a cautionary tale about the involvement of politicians (especially 
crooked politicians) in what should be a pristinely expert—even scientific—agency action. It 
certainly is a cautionary tale. But none of this episode involved decisions that could ever 
possibly be made solely on the basis of ―scientific‖ information or scientific methods (which is 
not to say that the latter cannot be used to improve decisions in many ways). See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl 
& James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
 130. When this matter is ultimately litigated, it will probably be a function of the specific 
economic analysis (and the many assumptions driving it) produced by FWS‘s contractor, 
Industrial Economics, Inc., that has dominated the parties‘ attention thus far. In extensive 
comments on that analysis, Defenders of Wildlife argued that, in general, it lacked any 
quantification of the benefits of a critical habitat designation, noting that it ―focuse[d] 
exclusively on the expected costs‖ of the action and was, therefore, ―one-sided‖ and 
―distorting.‖ Comments on the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service‘s Revised Critical Habitat for the 
Contiguous United States Distinct Population Segment of the Canada Lynx (Lynx Canadensis), 
at 2 (copy on file with author).  
 131. The Services are always careful to note that critical habitat designations have an 
inherent ―educational‖ value. See, e.g., 74 Reg. at 8653 (―Critical habitat designation educates 
the public about the location of core lynx habitat and areas most important for the recovery of 
this species.‖). 
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1,800 to roughly 39,000 square miles across six states.
132
 Yet the 
Services envision it as more than a social signal,
133
 and it should be 
said that the Services have encountered skepticism in court when they 
have reached virtually any critical habitat judgment without record 
evidence.
134
 For now, though, they seem not to be budging from the 
conviction that ESA section 4(b) leaves them considerable discretion 
in how they balance all the disparate factors it mentions.
135
 
Of course, given the persistent uncertainties surrounding lynx 
conservation and restoration
136
 and the highly variable cycles of lynx 
survival and prosperity, we might just as well double back to the 
unadulterated normative questions themselves. What should decide 
for FWS, for example, whether a critical habitat designation will 
actually reduce the overall intensity of snowmobiling in backcountry 
areas or will, instead, merely shift its location?
137
 Such a prediction is 
almost certainly socioeconomic in nature—about as far from lynx 
ecology as can be. To what degree must FWS weigh the probabilities 
of human behavior, technology, social norms, and/or natural selection 
 
 132. Compare 71 Fed Reg. at 66,030 (table), with 74 Fed. Reg. at 8642 (table). FWS‘s lead 
lynx biologist was interviewed in February 2009 and maintained that this was the largest 
terrestrial animal critical habitat designation ever. See Susan Gallagher, Lynx Critical Habitat 
Increases, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 25, 2009, at 1.  
 133. Cf. 74 Fed. Reg. at 8634 (―Critical habitat designations identify, to the extent known 
using the best scientific data available, habitat areas that provide essential life cycle needs of the 
species . . . .‖). 
 134. Cf. Bldg. Indus. Ass‘n v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. at 893, 906 (D.D.C. 1997) (rejecting 
FWS finding that critical habitat designation was not ―prudent‖ in part because designation 
might enable would-be vandals to destroy designated habitat).  
 135. See Memorandum for the Solicitor, United States Department of the Interior, The 
Secretary‘s Authority to Exclude Areas from a Critical Habitat Designation under Section 
4(b)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (Oct. 3, 2008) (M-37016). 
 136. Leonard F. Ruggiero & Kevin S. McKelvey, Toward a Defensible Lynx Conservation 
Strategy: A Framework for Planning in the Face of Uncertainty, in ECOLOGY AND 
CONSERVATION OF LYNX IN THE UNITED STATES 5, 8 (Leonard F. Ruggiero et al. eds., 2000). 
 137. Cf. 74 Fed. Reg. at 8629 (responding to commenter that welfare gains from 
restrictions on snowmobiling owing to CHD may well be cancelled out by welfare losses from 
increased crowding among snowmobilers and that, therefore, the ―analysis does not assume that 
there is a net decrease in snowmobiling but a change in the distribution of [its] occurrence‖). 
Two economists working with Defenders of Wildlife on its comments to the economic analysis 
had elsewhere argued that omission of such benefit calculations ―reduces the informational 
value of the analysis,‖ and thus compromises their utility. See Timm Kroeger & Frank Casey, 
Economic Impacts of Designating Critical Habitat under the U.S. Endangered Species Act: 
Case Study of the Canada Lynx (Lynx Canadensis), 11 HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF WILDLIFE 437, 
450 (2006).  
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itself in order to take ―action‖? All of this data and data integration, 
supposing it could be done, would establish only the relative costs 
and benefits of taking an action Congress has itself strictly limited in 
its legal significance. Should not the Service be constrained in what it 
invests in such decisions by the benefits its actions can even possibly 
generate? 
And what real expertise has FWS to decide whether current land 
management plans, policies, and laws are—or may end up being—
better ―conservation practices‖ for a listed taxon than the critical 
habitat designation? The latter means the injection of a resource-
starved federal wildlife agency increasingly beset by litigation, staff 
shortages, and informational scarcity, into an indefinite list of 
activities involving both the taxon and the federal government. The 
language of ESA section 4(b) invites the Services to make just this 
kind of multi-factored judgment.
138
 Yet, in reality, they must guess at 
such junctures. In the original 2006 critical habitat rule, FWS 
pointedly deferred to the ―Lynx Conservation Assessment and 
Strategy‖ (―LCAS‖), a multi-agency management framework created 
in 2000 by the Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and 
FWS.
139
 In this LCAS,
140
 several different agencies pooled their 
expertise and information on lynx to establish measurable goals for 
lynx habitat conservation in a wide range of federal land management 
units across the West.
141
 Critics attacked this use of the LCAS,
142
 and 
 
 138. If there is any part of the ESA more deeply qualified in its commitment to 
conservation by ―other factors,‖ I have never found it. ESA section 4(b)(2) states that critical 
habitat shall be designated ―on the basis of the best scientific data available and after taking into 
consideration the economic impact, the impact on national security, and any other relevant 
impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat. The Secretary may exclude any area 
from critical habitat if he determines that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of 
specifying such area as part of the critical habitat . . . .‖ 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). 
 139. See 71 Fed. Reg. at 66,010. 
 140. See BILL RVEDIGER ET AL., U.S.D.A FOREST SERVICE, CANADA LYNX 
CONSERVATION ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter LCAS]. 
 141. The focus in the LCAS was creating practicable measures to be incorporated into the 
land management plans required of the Forest Service and BLM by the enabling legislation. 
LCAS, supra note 140, at 1–4. ―Irrespective of the limitations of current knowledge, 
management of lynx habitat will occur on nearly 50 national forests, BLM field offices in 6 
states, 7 national parks, and possibly on a few wildlife refuges . . . The conservation strategy 
must provide guidance that retains future options provides management consistency, offers 
necessary flexibility, and conserves lynx and lynx habitat.‖ Id. at 3. 
 142. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife et al., Comments on the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
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FWS later recanted, concluding in 2009 that the LCAS, while helpful 
to federal land managers, ought not to preempt the designation of 
critical habitat.
143
 ESA section 5 directs FWS to cooperate with the 
Forest Service in acquiring land for the National Forest System to 
―conserve fish, wildlife, and plants‖ therein, ―including‖ those that 
are listed.
144
 But Congress has never seen fit to invest FWS with the 
sort of human resources that would enable it to judge the efficacy of 
the Forest Service‘s (or others‘) conservation practices. 
Whether the lynx‘s current distribution and abundance in the 
contiguous United States is worth the trouble FWS already has had 
with this DPS or not, it seems right to conclude at least the following: 
(1) even with much better information about the lynx or its ecology, a 
recognizably complete risk analysis of any of the choices outlined 
above would essentially be out of order so long as restorative work 
would rebuild future lynx populations;
145
 and (2) the multi-factored 
analysis that section 4 demands in the listing and critical habitat 
procedures would actually amount to comparative institutional 
analysis—something well beyond the present abilities of the 
Services. The most potent lesson here, however, may be one of 
politics, publicity, and the shaping of public priorities. The median 
legislator in Congress has very little reason to care about the lynx 
saga or the forces that converged to create it. Indeed, the lynx is 
arguably the most anonymous ―charismatic megafauna‖—and 
sometime beneficiary of federal management—ever.146 While the 
ESA has withstood attempts at its repeal, because of the annual 
appropriations process (not to mention a stream of exceptions like, 
 
Service‘s Revised Critical Habitat for the Contiguous United States Distinct Population 
Segment of the Canada Lynx (Lynx canadensis), Revised Proposed Rule. 73 Fed. Reg. 62,450 
(Oct. 21, 2008), letter of Nov. 20, 2008, at 5 (on file with author). 
 143. See 71 Fed. Reg. at 66,020. 
 144. 16 U.S.C. § 1534. 
 145. Global extinction risks, in other words, present the kind of definite outcomes that can 
be matched up with alternative possible futures and compared. Declining abundance and/or 
range, however, arguably lack the definition and determinate variables that make a risk analysis 
productive. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.  
 146. Cf. Shannon Petersen, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A Legislative History of 
the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463 (1999) (reviewing the ESA‘s history and innate 
connection with charismatic megafauna from the Puerto Rican parrot to the black-footed ferret 
without ever mentioning the lynx). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
266 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 32:237 
 
 
for example, the Sikes Act
147
), it remains a far cry from an effective 
solution to biodiversity loss. Unfortunately, boosting appropriations 
will do little to address the underlying predicament (although more 
money might help at the margins). As Part III argues, the demands 
for information and proceduralized deliberation in conservation today 
are most likely insatiable. And the more they are set and met as 
parameters for federal agency action, the more vicious becomes the 
circle they draw. Part III describes the imbalanced triaging system 
into which the ESA has evolved. 
III. DELIBERATE TRIAGE: QUANTIFYING, PRIORITIZING, AND 
SIGNALING RISKS 
Evidence-based conservation and standard risk analyses, 
especially when decision makers must weigh and compare several 
disparate choice factors, have daunting informational needs. The 
further we have delved into ―population viability analysis‖ (―PVA‖), 
the less certain we are that we can ever know which biological 
entities merit our protection.
148
 When integrated into the choice 
situations that real actors like the Services face, PVA becomes a 
veritable black hole for information.
149
 Thus, judicial review that 
identifies ―rationality‖ with reason-giving150 predictably renders 
agency inaction more likely even while our judiciary resists 
reviewing inaction in itself.
151
 And the further we look into our future 
 
 147. Pub. L. No. 86-797, 74 Stat. 1052 (1960), codified as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 670a–o. 
 148. Many extinction probability estimates are, given the paucity of evidence one way or 
the other, essentially meaningless. See, e.g., John Feiberg & Stephen P. Ellner, When Is It 
Meaningful to Estimate an Extinction Probability?, 81(7) ECOLOGY 2040 (2000). 
 149. See Martin Drechsler & Mark Burgman, Combining Population Viability Analysis 
with Decision Analysis, 13 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERV. 115 (2004). Some of the cognitive 
barriers are being addressed by the mainstreaming of serviceable PVA software. See Tim 
Coulson et al., The Use and Abuse of Population Viability Analysis, 15(5) TRENDS ECOL. & 
EVOL. 219, 220 (2001). Nothing can eliminate the need for real data, though. Id. at 220.  
 150. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (―The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of 
discretion. . . .‖); Ass‘n of Data Proc. Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 
684 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (―Review [of agency factual findings] without an agency record . . . comes 
down to review of reasonableness.‖). 
 151. Cf. Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 23 (2008) (―Any time a court reviews an agency decision, the court is in 
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as the outlines of a (radically) disrupted global climate come into 
focus, the more urgent our decisional trees seem. The recent listing of 
the Polar bear as ―threatened‖ under the ESA illustrates this trap in 
Section B. Section A first considers the normative and positive senses 
of information availability.  
A. The Structuring Influences of Uncertainty: Beyond “Availability” 
Heuristics  
The ESA famously joins its most critical required findings to the 
use of the ―best available‖ ―scientific‖ information.152 But what is the 
best available scientific information
153
 as a norm? Clearly, there is a 
sense in which ―available‖ in this standard is just a matter of fact: if 
an agent possesses scientific data, it must be used.
154
 But one evident 
alternative—a normative sense in which agents must account to 
someone else for their data gaps—has factored prominently in the 
few judicial decisions invalidating or questioning the Services‘ 
judgments on the availability of information.
155
 And it assumes that 
 
some way interfering with agency resource allocation, and not just where a court compels an 
agency to take a particular action.‖). 
 152. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 129, at 16–19.  
 153. ―Best available scientific information‖ is a phrase that appears in no fewer than a 
dozen different conservation and environmental statutes—and is defined in none of them. See 
Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t 
Always Better Policy, 75 WASH U. L.Q. 1029, 1034 n.9 (1995). 
 154. As J.B. Ruhl has argued, this sense of the term renders the clause essentially 
redundant in our legal system given the scope and nature of ―arbitrary and capricious‖ review 
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. See J.B. Ruhl, The Battle over Endangered 
Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555, 582 (2004). 
 155. See, e.g., Western Watersheds Project v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 
1183–85 (D. Idaho 2007); Kern County Farm Bureau v. Allen, 450 F.3d 1072, 1080–81 (9th 
Cir. 2006); Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 926 F. Supp. 920, 924–27 (D. Ariz. 
1996). Economists long ago accepted that it could be entirely rational to forego collecting 
information the costs of which outweighed any of its expected benefits. See, e.g., George J. 
Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). This corresponded 
roughly with the rise of ―bounded rationality‖ as a methodological assumption in the study of 
human and organizational behavior. Most proponents of such structured search, thus, assume 
that some kind of ―optimal search‖ strategy exists, at least theoretically, for virtually any 
informational demand. See Peter Morgan & Richard Manning, Optimal Search, 53 
ECONOMETRICA 923 (1985). Thus, the ―best available‖ scientific information requirements in 
the ESA probably allow that some search costs will not be worth incurring. Cf. SCIENCE AND 
THE ESA, supra note 2, at 126–29 (arguing that estimation techniques, even techniques with 
known flaws, often are clearly superior to information collection in aiding decision making).  
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judging the informational insufficiencies is rightly carried out by the 
intensely interested few who go to court and/or by the judiciary
156—
returning us to exactly the sort of comparative institutional analysis 
so few in government have any expertise in conducting.
157
  
Even putting aside search costs and the risks of indefinite 
searching, ‗available information‘ can be a notoriously corrosive 
influence in both individual and collective decision making.
158
 So-
called ‗availability cascades,‘ are proven causes of some of the most 
persistent forms of irrationality and unreason: through these cascades, 
a pool of agents will keep repeating a mistaken judgment from the 
―available‖—though perhaps radically incomplete or incorrect—
information.
159
 Moreover, even beyond availability cascades, the 
―best‖ available information can subtly rigidify decision makers who, 
intent on assuring others that they have done their ―best,‖ grow 
resistant to critique, re-analysis, and/or subsequent correction.
160
 Such 
indirect consequences of the ESA‘s underlying premises are surely 
hard to quantify. And a more immediate concern may be the extent to 
which this particular normative ideal has rendered ESA ―actions‖ 
sclerotic.
161
 So what ought we to expect from the Services as they 
 
 156. Cf. Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1208 (D. Or. 2001) (articulating a 
presumption that ―best available scientific information‖ is used and requiring a challenging 
party to rebut that presumption with more than mere allegations). 
 157. This perhaps explains the waning interest of some courts in ―best available 
information‖ claims generally. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Badgley, 335 F.3d 
1097 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 158. See PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 106–07 (2000). 
 159. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999); Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive 
Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747 (1990). Even worse is when an 
―expert‖ makes such a mistake and then others lazily copy it in light of that actor‘s reputation. 
Kuran & Sunstein, supra, at 737–38. A large, diverse population, at least, will not perceive 
risks according to the same (or ―correlated‖) biases. Finally, to a measurable extent, some 
biases are exacerbated and/or trimmed by one‘s hard-to-alter ―worldviews.‖ See Dan M. Kahan 
et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071 
(2006); cf. Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Environmental Tribalism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 
1099 (2003) (describing the formative influences of ―worldview‖ in qualitative terms). 
 160. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 159, at 754 & n.249. 
 161. Litigation brought to enforce this more normative sense of ―best available 
information‖ against the Services has often been protracted, highly visible, and antagonistic. 
See, e.g., Western Watersheds Project v. Kempthorne, 2008 WL 2338501 (D. Idaho 2008); Ctr. 
for Biological Diversity v. Badgley, 335 F.3d at 1097; Western Watersheds Project v. Fish & 
Wildlife Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Idaho 2007). 
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carry out the Herculean tasks required by the ESA? The ―policy 
scientist‖ suggested by Harold Lasswell and his successors162—the 
skillful professional who blended interdisciplinary science with 
practical political sense—was always a vision, never a reality.163 But 
as we intuit ways to cope with the two framing assumptions laid out 
above, both the direct and indirect consequences of the ESA‘s ―best 
available‖ information standards ought to enter the assessment.  
Consider for a moment one court‘s recent holding that FWS had 
not used the best available scientific information in reaching a ―not 
warranted‖ finding on several petitions to list the greater sage 
grouse.
164
 The Service had convened a panel of seven outside 
scientists with relevant expertise and asked them when the sage 
grouse would go extinct.
165
 Only three of those panelists seemed to 
believe the grouse was likely to be extinct within a century; the other 
four said it probably would take longer.
166
 The Service director 
ultimately concluded that listing was not warranted, in large part 
because of this outcome on the panel.
167
 This actually was a rather 
clever procedure: ―majority voting most effectively aggregates the 
information dispersed among the panel of experts. Nose counting of 
 
 162. Lasswell‘s ideal was recently refurbished by Professors Shapiro and Schroeder. See 
Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic 
Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 437–45 (2008).  
 163. See James Farr et al., The Policy Scientist of Democracy: The Discipline of Harold D. 
Lasswell, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 579 (2006). ―The policy scientist of democracy . . . was—and 
is—too demanding and contradictory a hero, aspiring to possess too much power and expertise 
and to sit too closely and comfortably with those in power.‖ Id. at 586. 
 164. Western Watersheds Project v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1173.  
 165. Id. at 1180. The panel was not asked for a final written report or to respond to the 
listing petitions or to make findings on any particular listing factor in ESA section 4 or on 
whether to list as threatened or endangered. Id. First, the panelists each were given 100 ―votes‖ 
to allocate as between (1) extinction in 100 years, and/or (2) various intervals longer than 100 
years. Each panelist was then asked to rank order the threats facing the grouse. Id. Finally, the 
panelists were given the opportunity to amend their allocation of votes in light of how their 
peers voted—at which point ―36% of the votes cast were for extinction within 100 years‖—but 
sixty-four percent of the votes were cast against that outcome. Id.  
 166. Id. at 1180. After the panelists were briefed on existing and projected future 
conservation projects for the grouse, one of the three recanted their >100 year vote. Id. A 
second panel comprised of FWS managers who had observed the experts‘ deliberations was 
then asked to evaluate how an ESA section 4 analysis ought to come out. That team also chose 
100 years as the benchmark timeline and five of those seven believed that the grouse would not 
go extinct in that period of time. Id. at 1181.  
 167. Id.  
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the assembled experts is a means by which the agency can in effect 
aggregate expert views, even if the agency itself lacks first-order 
competence.‖168 Allowing each expert one hundred ―votes‖ gave 
them an opportunity to express their judgments probabilistically. 
Unfortunately, on review, Judge Winmill found that the ―best 
science‖ was ―represented by the expert panel‖169 and chastised the 
agency for aggregating the panelists‘ views as it had.170 In the court‘s 
view, because no record had been kept of the panel‘s deliberations, 
―FWS failed to adequately preserve . . . the ‗best science,‘‖ making it 
impossible ―to review whether the Team and the Director accurately 
applied the ‗best science‘ represented by the expert panel.‖171 This 
was, to put it mildly, naïve. There is no such thing as information 
unmediated by the persons conveying it.
172
 Indeed, FWS‘s panel was 
arguably managed expertly given the possibilities of strategic 
behavior, groupthink,
173
 and the existence of past ESA section 4 
precedents open to conflicting interpretations.
174
  
The notion that the ―best scientific data available‖ somehow was 
repressed in the process simply because the agency did not keep a 
 
 168. Adrian Vermeule, The Parliament of the Experts, 58 DUKE L.J. 2231, 2245 (2009). 
 169. Western Watersheds Project v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 
(emphasis added). This is a curious conclusion: the ―best science‖—or, more specifically, the 
―best scientific or commercial data available‖—cannot be ―represented,‖ by scientists or anyone 
else. For the ultimate decision on listing belonged to the Director as the Secretary had legally 
delegated that responsibility to him. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b). Of course, probing the 
Director‘s mind was out of the question. Cf. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) 
(even where administrative proceeding is ―adjudicative‖ in nature, the official who decides 
ought never be examined on how his or her decision was made).  
 170. Western Watersheds Project v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1183–84. 
 171. Id. at 1183–84. 
 172. Recall, moreover, that courts generally must review the record agencies generate 
unless a statute requires the record take a particular form. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 
142 (1973). 
 173. It is entirely possible that panel members would have no incentive to vote sincerely, to 
acquire information in preparation for such panels, or to express themselves candidly had FWS 
changed any of the conditions under which this panel operated. See Vermeule, supra note 168, 
at 2257–74. ―[U]nder identifiable conditions, the accuracy of the group‘s median or mean 
member will necessarily exceed that of its single most competent member.‖ Id. at 2259 (citing 
SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, 
FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 158 (2007)).  
 174. In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1998), the 
court used the report generated by an outside expert panel—a panel of experts that had 
recommended listing the taxa at issue but had not considered all of ESA section 4‘s listing 
factors before doing so—as one of the grounds for invalidating the listing rule under challenge.  
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detailed enough record of what several experts expressed is an 
accusation, nothing more.
175
 Whatever else the domain experts who 
populated this panel expressed their judgments on, they almost 
certainly had no expertise in evaluating the ―conservation practices‖ 
of the affected actors.
176
 Finally, recall that the Act says nothing 
about how the Services ought to collect or integrate the best scientific 
information ―available.‖ The Services alone must do that on a 
rolling—and repeat—basis.177  
B. Constructing a “Foreseeable Future”: Ursus Maritimus at Risk 
The Polar bear (Ursus maritimus) has become global climate 
disruption‘s mascot precisely because of its powerful symbolism 
among those who care little about climate change. It presents to those 
who care very deeply the prospect of motivating others without data 
or explicit linkages of cause to effect. But what happens when the 
Polar bear‘s persuasive powers run out? Arguments for bold action 
that involve the Polar bear are, after all, enthymematic: they omit key 
premises that might, when spelled out, change some minds. Of 
course, one takeaway from the pitched struggle over centralized 
regulatory review by the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (―OIRA‖) is that fear and its manipulation have become key 
variables in our regulatory state.
178
 People can fear the loss of Polar 
 
 175. The court had plenty of accusations, too. See Western Watersheds Project v. Fish & 
Wildlife Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1183–85, 1187–89. Unfortunately, this was another 
proceeding in which Julie MacDonald played a role. Id. at 11188 (―MacDonald‘s principal 
tactic is to steer the ―best science‖ to a pre-ordained outcome. That may explain why so much 
of the ―best science‖ in this case was verbally communicated and never reduced to writing 
. . . .‖). The bifurcated panel approach is, in large measure, what FWS has used in other 
proceedings, though. See, e.g., Western Watersheds Project v. Kempthorne, 2008 WL 2338501, 
at *5–14 (D. Idaho 2008).  
 176. But cf. ESA § 4(b)(2)–(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)–(3). 
 177. ―The magnitude of a perceived risk depends on how readily an individual can recall 
instances of misfortune associated with that risk.‖ Kahan et al., supra note 159, at 1085. But 
domain experts are, unfortunately, just as capable of errors in risk perception as lay people. ―As 
is true of disagreements among members of the public generally, disagreements among risk 
experts are distributed in patterns that cannot plausibly be linked either to access to information 
or capacity to understand it.‖ Id. at 1093. A wealth of research suggests that even experts are 
subject to a variety of biasing influences. Id. at 1093–96, nn.68–85. 
 178. Compare CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE (2005) (arguing that ordinary citizens often are induced to fear trivial risks while 
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bears or pikas
179
 without understanding what meaningful action 
against climate change entails. But what if these fears skew the 
allocation of scarce conservation resources? 
In its recent listing of the Polar bear as ―threatened,‖ FWS 
confronted a carnivore ―believed to be completely dependent upon 
Arctic sea ice for survival.‖180 Arctic sea ice, of course, is in jeopardy 
as summers in the Arctic grow warmer and warmer.
181
 Modeling 
collected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(―IPCC‖) suggests these trends will worsen, although substantial 
variance still divides particular models.
182
 Putting together Polar bear 
ecology and (modeled) future Arctic conditions left FWS with a 
dilemma: characterizing the urgency of this particular taxon‘s 
troubles. The Act permits ―threatened‖ designations where the taxon 
is likely to become ―endangered‖ throughout all or a significant 
portion of its range within the ―foreseeable future.‖183 But what is the 
foreseeable future where global climatological processes are 
concerned? A century? A decade?  
The Polar bear listing was an exercise in default assumptions and 
informational scarcity, clearly.
184
 It was also a signal from FWS to 
the world at large. Polar bear populations are currently about as 
robust as at any time on record and the determination was, therefore, 
 
ignoring significant risks and that experts normally will process these risks more rationally), 
with Kahan et al., supra note 159, at 1106–08 (arguing that risks can be misperceived just as 
readily by experts and that expert dismissals of supposedly trivial risks amount to anti-
democratic, illiberal advancement of ―partisan visions of the ideal society‖). 
 179. Ruhl, supra note 65, at 2 (―[T]he American pika is running out of places to live, and 
global climate change appears to be the primary cause of its decline.‖). 
 180. 12-Month Petition Finding and Proposed Rule to List the Polar Bear (Ursus 
maritimus) as Threatened Throughout Its Range, 72 Fed. Reg. 1064, 1071 (Jan. 9, 2007) (to be 
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) [hereinafter 12-Month Petition]. 
 181. Id. at 1071 (―Observations have shown a decline in late summer Arctic sea ice extent 
of 7.7 percent per decade and in the perennial sea ice area of up to 9.8 percent per decade since 
1978.‖). 
 182. Id. at 1072. 
 183. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(20), 1533(a), (b)(1)–(2). 
 184. Cf. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits 
in Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1421 (2008) (―[T]he burden of information 
production and the burden of persuasion rest squarely on the regulatory agency, and the default 
position is that there is no regulation unless and until the agency can establish, by ―reasoned 
elaboration‖ capable of withstanding judicial review, a convincing . . . justification . . . .‖). 
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based on projected habitat loss.
185
 Confident predictions of future 
habitat conditions, in short, were the principal—if not necessarily the 
sole—grounds for the agency‘s finding. Though perhaps 
unprecedented, this probabilism was long overdue. Yet, 
paradoxically, the complexities of global climate processes actually 
make the long run more predictable than the short run on this point.
186
 
So why would the Service interpret the Act‘s foreseeability notion as 
a function of the Polar bear‘s generations? Was it because the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (―IUCN‖) had 
interpreted its forecasting role that way in keeping its so-called ―Red 
List‖?187 With projected ice-free summers by about 2040, the Arctic 
is now expected to become much less advantageous for Polar bears in 
about three generations
188—exactly the benchmark IUCN uses for its 
―vulnerable‖ status designations.189 Indeed, the Department of the 
Interior later stated that default time periods are of little-to-no-value 
in constructing a ―foreseeable‖ future190—that foreseeability is 
 
 185. See 12-Month Petition, supra note 180, at 1081 (positive finding on Factor A); id. at 
1085 (negative finding for Factor B); id. at 1086 (negative finding for Factor C); id. at 1091 
(negative finding for Factor D); id. at 1094 (negative finding for Factor E). The Service did note 
that future stresses from contaminants (Factor E), over-harvestation, and/or site-specific 
disturbances (Factor D) could interact with the projected future habitat losses to augment the 
threats to Polar bears at a population level. Id. at 1095. 
 186. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 594–645 (2007) (evaluating available models and concluding 
that variability increases as particular locations and time frames become the focus). 
 187. IUCN‘s Species Survival Commission and its Polar Bear Study Group updated their 
assessment in 2006, reclassifying the Polar bear as ―vulnerable.‖ 12-Month Petition, supra note 
180, at 1081. IUCN Red List guidelines allow generations to be calculated in a number of ways, 
but the most common is as the age of sexual maturity plus fifty percent of the lifetime 
reproductive period and that vulnerability in the foreseeable future means three generations or 
less. See STANDARDS AND PETITIONS WORKING GROUP, IUCN SSC BIODIVERSITY 
ASSESSMENTS SUB-COMMITTEE, GUIDELINES FOR USING THE IUCN RED LIST CATEGORIES 
AND CRITERIA 22–23 (Version 7.0, 2008) [hereinafter IUCN REDLIST GUIDELINES] (on file 
with author); 12-Month Petition, supra note 180, at 170–71. That put the Polar bear‘s 
generation at fifteen years and the Service found that IUCN‘s use of three generations as a 
baseline in its threat assessments was ―reasonable.‖ Id. at 1070.  
 188. Id. at 1080–81. 
 189. See IUCN REDLIST GUIDELINES, supra note 187, at 13. 
 190. These conclusions contrast with the judge‘s notions of foreseeability in the sage 
grouse case. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the IUCN‘s Red 
List Guidelines stipulate that, in assessing vulnerability, either a set period of years or certain 
set generational increments should be used, whichever is longer. IUCN REDLIST GUIDELINES, 
supra note 187, at 56–57. 
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necessarily a matter of threats and populations and that ―reliable 
predictions with respect to multiple trends and threats over different 
periods of time‖ depend upon careful ―synthesis.‖191 What it has 
never done is explain the role that such policy judgments play in 
Service deliberations/actions more generally. 
After all, what made FWS‘s signal so significant was not its 
ultimate conclusion: there is widespread agreement that Polar bears 
face a real risk of extinction.
192
 It was methodologically significant in 
that it took up so much data from so many different domain 
experts,
193
 assigned a high significance to the probable loss of Arctic 
sea ice,
194
 and yet still purported to produce a wholly factual 
conclusion: a ―danger of extinction throughout all or a significant 
portion of its range‖ ―within the foreseeable future.‖195 It was 
significant, that is, because of how separate its assessment of the 
bear‘s ―conservation status‖ was made to seem from that of its 
 
 191. The Meaning of “Foreseeable Future” in Section 3(20) of the Endangered Species 
Act, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Op. Off. Solicitor M-37021, 13 (Jan. 16, 2009). 
 192. See 12-Month Petition, supra note 180, at 1081. Moreover, contrary to implications in 
some critiques of the Polar bear decision, see, e.g., J. Scott Armstrong et al., Polar Bear 
Population Forecasts: A Public-Policy Forecasting Audit, 38(5) INTERFACES 382, 389 (2008), 
FWS used the best scientific information currently available in responding to the listing 
petitions—just as the statute required. While the ―forecasts‖ FWS was forced to make involved 
several key ―assumptions,‖ relied heavily on the still-primitive ―general circulation models‖ 
available in 2007, and arguably strayed from certain forecasting protocols championed by 
Armstrong and his colleagues, see id. at 383–89, it is pure fantasy to suggest that changes along 
any of these lines would have rendered the listing proceeding more ―scientific.‖ But cf. J. Scott 
Armstrong et al., What is the Appropriate Public-Policy Response to Uncertainty?, 38(5) 
INTERFACES 404, 405 (2008) (suggesting that FWS did not follow ―scientific procedures‖ in its 
Polar bear listing proceeding). As Amstrup and colleagues argued in response, GCM‘s and 
basic knowledge of the physics of the Earth‘s solar energy balancing make it a virtual certainty 
that warming will continue as greenhouse gas concentrations rise and that ice-free summers in 
the Arctic will eventually occur—and that that certainty only increases the further into the 
future the projections stretch. Steven C. Amstrup et al., Rebuttal of “Polar Bear Population 
Forecasts: A Public-Policy Forecasting Audit,” 39(4) INTERFACES 353, 355–57 (2009). In 
other words, the immediacy of thawing in the Arctic may be open to reasonable doubt without 
the probability of thawing being so.  
 193. See 12-Month Petition, supra note 180, at 1065 (a panel of twelve outside experts and 
ten ―peer reviewers‖ used in Status Assessment).  
 194. The USGS scientists whose work on the Polar bear supported FWS‘s listing 
determination have said that this probability was unequivocally the most powerful influence in 
their estimates. See Amstrup et al., supra note 192, at 9–11. 
 195. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(6), (20) (2000). 
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―conservation priority.‖196 These two are perhaps epistemically 
different things—one of them positive, the other normative. Yet, 
while they may present distinct kinds of choices, they are tightly 
coupled as a practical matter. For example, a taxon‘s chances for 
survival influence the priority any particular actor assigns its 
conservation.
197
 Before we respond that ―status‖ assessments should 
always precede ―prioritization‖ in conservation, recall the 
informational barriers involved and the need for at least some 
prioritizations in order to rank all of the candidates for assessment.
198
  
Let us consider the Polar bear as a global conservation priority. 
Assigning it a high priority is at least counterintuitive next to 
quantitative metrics like richness-to-cost ratios
199
 and what it 
probably will take to arrest the trends in Arctic sea ice. Yet the Polar 
bear dominated conservation politics for years, literally embodying 
the implausibility of separating what we know—or think we know—
from our priorities. Moreover, given the structure of ESA section 
4,
200
 to say nothing of FWS‘s own quite jaundiced listing priority 
 
 196. This was important because confusion of conservation status with conservation 
priority is a common error globally. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Miller et al., National Threatened 
Species Listing Based on IUCN Criteria and Regional Guidelines: Current Status and Future 
Perspectives, 21(3) CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 684, 689 (2007). Maintaining the distinction in 
the Polar bear‘s case is doubly significant given how comparatively few species are at risk 
exactly because of the Arctic‘s loss of sea ice and how extensive will be the measurable human 
consequences of reversing the causal influences behind that particular environmental 
disturbance. Judging from the specific rulemakings that followed—including the special rule 
under ESA section 4(d) and the changes to ESA section 7 consultation procedures (later 
rescinded)—the Service‘s ―status‖ assessment was intimately bound up with its ―priority‖ 
assessment as a practical matter.  
 197. Cf. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XIV 25 (Richard Flathman ed., 1997) (1651) 
(―[T]o promise that which is known to be Impossible, is no Covenant.‖); IMMANUEL KANT, 
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON A548 (N.K. Smith trans., 1929) (1787) (―The action to which the 
‗ought‘ applies must indeed be possible under natural conditions.‖); Ruhl, supra note 179, at 61 
(―The agency‘s objective should be to avoid accelerating the decline of species who stand no 
chance of surviving climate change, but not to take measures on their behalf which could pose 
threats to other species.‖). 
 198. See supra notes 45, 149 and accompanying text.  
 199. See, e.g., Andrew Balmford et al., Integrating Costs of Conservation into 
International Priority Setting, 14 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 597, 599 (2000); Brooks et al., 
supra note 75, at 60–61. 
 200. The Act requires the Services to hear and decide petitions roughly as they are filed. 
See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 254 F.3d 833, 837–40 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
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―guidelines,‖201 FWS was always facing severe constraints in how it 
responded to the Polar bear petition and justified its actions. As a 
―signal,‖ the Polar bear‘s listing status today begs the question of 
how we are responding to conservation‘s real challenges. 
To put the point more clinically, priority-setting and information 
availability are inescapably agent-centered. A somewhat clunky—but 
accurate—depiction of this nexus is that assessments of conservation 
status and priority are neither exogenous nor endogenous to one 
another because, while they should be epistemically 
distinguishable,
202
 each is vital to the other if they are to do real work 
as reasons for action. Now FWS only had reason to list and to act to 
―conserve‖ the Polar bear by virtue of its legal obligations under the 
ESA
203
 and its findings and conclusions about the bear‘s probable 
future. The balance of its reasons, in other words, stemmed from the 
norms imposed upon it, its own internal norms, and its ―available‖ 
information.
204
 In a real sense, that is, the Services‘ duties often are 
 
 201. See Endangered and Threatened Species Listing and Recovery Priority Guidelines, 48 
Fed. Reg. 43,098 (Sept. 21, 1983). In substance, the listing priority guidelines preference taxa 
that are (1) the most ―genetically distinct‖ from their evolutionary neighbors; (2) facing 
comparatively ―imminent‖ threats; and (3) likely to benefit from conservation actions. Id. at 
43103–05. But the Service recognized that assessing these factors was likely to become 
somewhat paradoxical in practice. Cf. id. at 43099 (―[T]he setting of listing priorities is an 
intermittent, rather than continuous, activity, and . . . information developed on a species 
believed to have a high priority may indicate that a lower priority is justified, but . . . this 
situation would not necessarily preclude its being listed while the status information was 
available and current.‖). 
 202. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 
86 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1620–29 (2008).  
 203. As already mentioned, the Services have been fortifying and rearranging those 
obligations for decades with their steady stream of rules, regulations, policies, plans, and 
guidelines. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. FWS‘s listing priorities could easily have 
included consideration of the information costs entailed in listing a taxon. Cf. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, Endangered and Threatened Species Listing and Recovery Priority Guideline Notice, 
48 Fed. Reg. 43,098, 43,100 (Sept. 1, 1983) (describing comments from Environmental 
Defense Fund cautioning against the over-analysis of listing decisions). But see id. at 43,103–04 
(explaining FWS‘s three ―criteria‖ in its listing priority matrix: immediacy of threat, magnitude 
of threat, and the degree of the taxon‘s genetic isolation, establishing twelve priority 
categories). 
 204. In the petition process, the Services must evaluate the merits of petitions based solely 
on the information presented in the petition. See, e.g., Colo. River Cutthroat Trout v. 
Kempthorne, 448 F. Supp. 2d 170, 176 (D.D.C. 2006). As for intent, petitioners likely did not 
expect the Services to weaken the consultation rules or to issue the special ESA section 4(d) 
rule. They probably rather saw the Polar bear as a public relations campaign. See, e.g., E.B. 
Boyd, Kassie Siegel ’95 Promotes the “Bear” Necessities, WM. & MARY MAG., Summer 2009, 
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the products of their own deliberation combined with that of others 
who purposefully deprive them of the discretion they would 
otherwise need to engage in uninhibited reason balancing. This is 
perhaps as it should be in a democratic constitutional order,
205
 but it 
is also a reminder that the Services‘ actions hardly ever are 
straightforwardly probabilistic.
206
 
More significantly, then, notice how FWS‘s finding on Polar bears 
confirmed the relevance of IUCN‘s work to its own section 4 status 
assessments—signaling the informational influence of that already-
expansive network on its practices.
207
 Given the extraordinary 
potential scope of this cooperation going forward, this aspect of the 
Polar bear proceeding may prove the most productive. If ESA 
practice has shown us anything, it is that combining the Services‘ 
deliberations with that of the actors around them is growing 
increasingly difficult, especially as reviewing courts impose their 
own normative preconceptions of deliberation
208
 and as the Services 
order their own ranks with increasingly cryptic instruments of law, 
policy, and planning.
209
 In short, with the costs of deliberation rising, 
public investments in conservation falling, and the challenges 
expanding, the practice of endangered species protection may be its 
own undoing unless and until its agents find better, more efficient 
ways of partnering and collaborating. Part IV makes the case for 
shifting the Services‘ attention considerably as they confront 
 
at 26 (explaining that Siegel and Cummings, lawyers for the Center for Biological Diversity, 
have long viewed the Polar bear as the ideal public relations tool). They perhaps even intended 
to spur congressional action on climate change. See id. But this is clearly the confusion of 
means and ends that has become so characteristic of the hyper-strategic environment in which 
ESA practice occurs today. 
 205. See supra note 36. 
 206. Cf. Leona K. Svancara et al., Policy-Driven Versus Evidence-based Conservation: A 
Review of Political Targets and Biological Needs, 55 BIOSCIENCE 989, 990–94 (2005) 
(contrasting evidence-based measurable goals and politically oriented measurable goals and 
concluding that the latter have almost always been unrelated to what biology or ecology reveal 
about species‘ needs).  
 207. The public announcement of this cooperation perhaps alleviated some transparency 
concerns that may have otherwise arisen, see, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of 
Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17–21 (2005), although it did 
nothing to mitigate the potential reputational cascades or other cognitive biases that networks of 
this kind often exacerbate. See Kahan et al., supra note 159.  
 208. See supra notes 157–67 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra notes 40–59 and accompanying text. 
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―conservation practices‖ all around them without the resources one 
would need properly to improve them.  
IV. MEASURING WITHOUT MANAGING?: COGNITIVE UNBUNDLING IN 
A NETWORKED WORLD 
A variety of mishaps in quantitation have garnered close attention 
in risk regulation lately,
210
 reminding us of how badly astray even 
well-intentioned exercises in quantification can go.
211
 To attack the 
use of quantitative methods root and branch by pointing to the 
mistakes they have generated is itself irrational, though.
212
 Mistakes 
are a constant throughout all of practical reason, and refusing to 
measure simply because of the risk of error is a good heuristic in very 
few settings. Risk regulation is about imagining possible futures and 
bringing about the desired futures we can both envision and 
collectively effectuate knowing what little we do about causes and 
effects.
213
 And to posit a quantified present probability of the threats 
to an organism, population, species, species-assemblage, or 
 
 210. The ―excesses‖ of quantitation would include, in the views of many, the use of 
monetary values to score risk reducing actions, the use of discount rates to scale future 
benefits/costs back to present value, and a host of other quantitative methods having either 
minor or serious shortcomings in and of themselves. See, e.g., SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra 
note 1; ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 8.  
 211. As Professor Kysar has argued, ―the formal language of the cost-benefit framework is 
not only irreducibly incomplete; it also is capable of denying its own incompleteness.‖ Douglas 
A. Kysar, Discounting . . . On Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 138 (2007). Unfortunately, though, 
qualitative reasoning purged of numeric estimation is just as ―incomplete,‖ if not more so. 
 212. See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 1–2 (2006); RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING 
RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND 
OUR HEALTH (2008). Indeed, virtually any quantitative technique can, given the right time and 
place, serve as a useful tool to policymakers. See, e.g., Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting 
and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 351 (2002) (reviewing the various 
methods and justifications for time discounting). 
 213. As Professor Dan Esty put it:  
 Uncertainty seems to be the hallmark of the environmental domain. Disagreements 
over how best to cope with information deficits have translated into bitterly partisan 
and divisive environmental politics and limited progress in recent years in pollution 
control and natural resource stewardship. Perhaps this picture represents the 
inescapable reality of the environmental realm. 
Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 118 
(2005). 
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ecosystem, is merely to continue our ―Enlightenment‖ so often traced 
to Newton, Leibniz, Hume, Bayes, and their successors.
214
 But 
modern conservation—compounding multiple probabilities estimated 
from disparate epistemic domains—requires many minds working in 
concert. That inevitably injects the imprecision of communication 
and the hazards of strategic, lazy, and/or biased decision making, all 
while attracting attention as a uniquely normative social event. 
Discouragingly, the more this form of collective action is patterned to 
our legal system as it is, the less ably it seems to approximate simple 
rationality. 
Of course this is not an interpretive argument. The ESA itself 
obviously assumes a healthy measure of risk assessment 
(conservation ―status‖) and risk management (prioritization and 
implementation) by its agents.
215
 The private sector, too, has begun 
separating these two broad kinds of work.
216
 When we confront 
defined probabilities, we have long supposed that the right response 
is to multiply whatever harm or benefit is at issue by that probability 
to derive a kind of ―discounted‖ factor and even to do so 
continuously as events unfold and information changes.
217
 That, 
 
 214. Compare COLIN HOWSON, HUME‘S PROBLEM: INDUCTION AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF 
BELIEF 168–220 (2000) (interpreting Hume‘s discussions of causality and probability 
throughout the Treatise and the Enquiry as a precursor to Bayes‘s concept of probability which 
collapsed it into partial beliefs subject to rationality constraints), with Michael E. Gilpin & 
Michael E. Soulé, Minimum Viable Populations: Processes of Species Extinction, in 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF SCARCITY AND DIVERSITY 19 (Michael E. Soulé 
ed., 1986) (proposing a mode of analysis, later known as population viability analysis, that 
seeks to isolate stochastic and deterministic influences relative to each other in order to enable 
quantitative measurement of the threats to survival). See also DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF 
HUMAN NATURE 334 (1740) (Dover 2003) (setting out Hume‘s famous dictum that ―is‖ and 
―ought‖ require different forms of reasoning). 
 215. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds, and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of 
Environmental Law, 63 MISS. L.J. 403 (1994). 
 216. See, e.g., CRAIG R. GROVES, DRAFTING A CONSERVATION BLUEPRINT (2003) 
(outlining an evidence-based approach to conservation planning by The Nature Conservancy or 
other resource acquisition firms). 
 217. See John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK 
VERSUS RISK, supra note 7, at 1. The cognitive capacity to execute such successive 
comparisons is another matter entirely. See id. On that more adaptive, ―Bayesian‖ approach to, 
for example, population viability analysis, see Bruce G. Marcot et al., Using Bayesian Belief 
Networks to Evaluate Fish and Wildlife Population Viability under Land Management 
Alternatives from an Environmental Impact Statement, 153 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 29 
(2001). 
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however, demands continuous refinement of probabilities and fairly 
precise accounts of the relevance of consequences.
218
 Given the pace 
of conservation practice, those conditions alone are enough for 
misgivings about ambitious quantification. Moreover, an added 
difficulty comes when internally plural actors—such as the 
Services—must aggregate dispersed information and then 
collectively weigh their choice factors. Because risks are unevenly 
distributed and the disparities of exposure are widely perceived, high-
profile deliberations of the kind (like ESA section 4 status changes) 
become an opportunity to revisit society‘s deepest fissures. So what is 
to be done? Part IV argues that unbundling and better distributing 
conservation‘s tasks may well be our best hope for developing 
institutions with true comparative advantages. 
A. Conservation Assessment in a Hostile World 
The Services face two daunting challenges framed by the ESA in 
its current form. First, they need to better adapt institutionally to the 
constant advances of probabilistic reasoning across a wide variety of 
relevant domains. Biology today is on the brink of giant leaps 
forward as we work to create the digital architecture empowering 
thousands (if not millions) of collaborators to pool and integrate their 
own bits of observational data.
219
 To look at them, the Services 
seemed poised to play essentially no role in that endeavor. ESA 
section 4 is just one example of a statute requiring the Services to 
solve for an array of complex, multivariate equations and to give 
reasons for whatever judgments they reach. And, given the chances 
that these reasons will be rejected in any given action, it is 
unsurprising that they have learned how to announce and defend,
220
 
 
 218. Establishing the (social) relevance of consequences in conservation is fraught with 
difficulty given the pervasive moral and political disagreements over what Kenneth Goodpaster 
called ―moral considerability.‖ See Kenneth Goodpaster, On Being Morally Considerable, 75 J. 
PHIL. 308 (1978). With deep disagreement over the relevance of consequences, investments in 
quantification often are moot. See generally Kai M Chan et al., When Agendas Collide: Human 
Welfare and Biological Conservation, 21 CONSERV. BIO. 59 (2007). 
 219. See Steve Kelling et al., Data-Intensive Science: A New Paradigm for Biodiversity 
Studies, 59 BIOSCIENCE 613 (2009). 
 220. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve?: Lessons from a Study in 
Maladaptive Management, 55 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 293, 308–23 (2007). 
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to dissemble when new data question their conclusions,
221
 and to 
minimize exposing their overall insufficiency for the jobs Congress 
handed them.
222
  
The obvious upshot of being organized for multiple roles is that 
the Services cannot optimize for any single role. And that means that, 
generally speaking, resources are a chief constraint.
223
 Ideally, the 
Services would have the expertise to provide needed coordination to 
the research currently being done on demography, dispersal, 
colonization, migration, habitat disruption, and speciation.
224
 But they 
are incapable of doing so today and, indeed, too often are unaware 
such research is even being conducted.
225
 In short, the Services have 
a lot of improving to do as networks. 
Secondly, and relatedly, they must better structure themselves to 
fit a fiscal environment and a political world full of existing 
―conservation practices‖ that are both hostile to top-down 
prescriptions of how properly to value nature. Jurisdictional plurality 
and the conditions it sets for democracy are genetically encoded in 
America and, by extension, in its conservation statutes. Our vertical 
and horizontal divisions of authority are more standard than ever 
today, even as our culture, economy, and communities scale upward 
and outward.
226
 And handing a society‘s richest, most challenging 
 
 221. See, e.g., Philip Kline, Grizzly Bear Blues: A Case Study of the Endangered Species 
Act’s Delisting Process and Recovery Plan Requirements, 31 ENVTL. L. 371 (2001) (detailing 
the selectivity of data uptake in the recovery planning for Grizzly bears). 
 222. See Jamison E. Colburn, The Indignity of Federal Wildlife Habitat Law, 57 ALA. L. 
REV. 417 (2005). 
 223. It is even possible to model the effects of ―enactments costs‖—the procedural and 
other investments agencies must make in their policymaking actions—on an agency‘s 
incentives to invest in acquiring expertise. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision 
Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 469 (2007). 
 224. See JAMES H. BROWN, MACROECOLOGY 230–35 (1995). 
 225. The accounts are too numerous to cite detailing the lack of scientific awareness—or 
blatant disregard of scientific data—at some decisional juncture within one of the Services. See, 
e.g., Liza Gross, Why Not the Best?: How Science Failed the Florida Panther, 3(9) PLOS BIO. 
1525 (2005) (detailing the ignorance and suppression of scientific data indicating demographic 
crises as a result of habitat loss in the remaining Florida panthers of southwestern Florida). 
Even if total awareness of the natural sciences were possible, the Services would still need to 
acquire a far better understanding of human behavior, as well. Cf. Chan et al., supra note 218, at 
65 (―Conservation biologists must also become more adept at bridging disciplinary divides and 
consulting the social science literature for insights about how to design culturally, politically, 
and socioeconomically appropriate conservation plans.‖). 
 226. This is our constitutionalism‘s paradox in a cosmopolitan world, though, not 
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questions about its relationship to nature to two smallish agencies 
with sub-cabinet-level leadership and politically vulnerable budgets 
is an odd way of prioritizing biodiversity. The Services need political 
leaders capable of reworking their organizations at a structural level.  
Organizational psychology has long distinguished between 
―disjunctive‖ tasks, in which only one person needs to succeed for the 
group to be successful, and ―conjunctive‖ tasks in which each 
person‘s contribution is critical to success.227 The ESA saddles the 
Services with far too many conjunctive tasks today, inviting their 
opponents to disrupt, delay, and defeat them
228
 and leaving them 
prone to side-tracking.
229
 From ―candidate‖ status to designated 
critical habitat for the Canada lynx contiguous-U.S. DPS took over 
twenty years—and is probably still not settled.230 If things were 
measurably improved for the lynx in that period, it was not due to 
FWS‘s swift actions on its behalf.  
It is often said that novices count in fives or tens while experts 
count in sixteenths. But this is half right at best. Most experts know 
 
conservation‘s. See, e.g., ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE 
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 10 (2009) (―Federalism is often linked with localism, 
with respect and affection for local institutions and local culture. Federalism generally exists in 
opposition to nationalism. The nationalizing trends in the United States, though, seem to be 
increasing.‖); cf. EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR 
THE MODERN STATE 47 (2005) (―The reified, nonheuristic character of the three-branch 
metaphor produces fruit of [an] . . . addictive nature. As a general matter, it induces us to 
underemphasize the administrative character of our government and overemphasize the value of 
political and judicial controls.‖). 
 227. See, e.g., Ivan D. Steiner, Models for Inferring Relationships between Group Size and 
Potential Group Productivity, 11(4) BEHAV. SCI. 273 (1966). 
 228. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 229. See Wyman, supra note 45; Sinden, supra note 128;  
 230. In Defenders of Wildlife v. Kempthorne, No. 04-1230 (GK) 2006 WL 2844232 
(D.D.C. 2006), the district court heard arguments on whether FWS had properly answered all of 
the court‘s questions about its findings and conclusions when listing the lynx as ―threatened‖ 
(and not ―endangered‖) in 2001. Id. at *9–13. Judge Kessler found that FWS had not fully 
answered why the loss of lynx range and abundance in the contiguous United States was not 
sufficient to list it as endangered under ESA section 4 and remanded the matter to FWS for a 
better explanation—which she ―hope[d] that FWS [could] accomplish . . . within 90 days.‖ Id. 
at *13. FWS obliged and ―clarified‖ its conclusions on the lynx‘s status, see Clarification of 
Significant Portion of the Range for the Contiguous United States Distinct Population Segment 
of the Canada Lynx, 72 Fed. Reg. 1186 (Jan. 10, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17), but 
later noticed yet another status review involving further geographic coverage for the DPS. See 
90-Day Finding on a Petition to Change the Listing Status of the Canada Lynx, 73 Fed. Reg. 
76,990 (Dec. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
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that cognitive shortcutting is indispensable in practice. Take the 
Services‘ ―warranted-but-precluded‖ findings and the paradoxical 
―candidate‖ statuses they now bestow.231 These are necessarily 
relative prioritizations based on qualitative judgments like the 
supposed ―magnitude‖ of known threats to a certain taxa.232 Because 
of the forces bearing down on them, though, the Services must 
literally over-parameterize these assessments in order to give 
plausible reasons for their actions—reasons that obscure deeply 
normative judgments of scale, value, and intuitive risk assessment.
233
 
Instead of conducting these analyses systematically, the Services 
camouflage them and obscure the fact that they generate irreducibly 
qualitative judgments. ―Well-designed risk-assessment processes 
create products that serve the needs of a community of consumers, 
including risk-managers, community and industrial stakeholders, risk 
assessors themselves, and ultimately the public.‖234 If ESA section 4 
could be that dialectical, the Services seem not to have noticed.
235
 
Try as we have, and no matter how often we are reminded that 
personifying agents of the state comes at great cost,
236
 we still 
misperceive entities like the Services as ―persons‖237 instead of 
 
 231. See supra notes 66–72, 79 and accompanying text. 
 232. See Listing Priority Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,098, 43,103 (Sept. 21, 1983). 
 233. The list of precedents demanding better, clearer ―reasons‖ for warranted-but-
precluded findings is long and growing. See, e.g., Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Serv., 945 F. Supp. at 1388; Carlton v. Babbitt, 900 F. Supp. 526 (D.D.C. 1995). 
 The Ninth Circuit, in particular, has taken to this game, demanding that clear ―reasons‖ for 
a warranted-but-precluded finding be published concurrent with the ―finding.‖ See, e.g., Ctr. for 
Biological Diversity v. Norton, 254 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2001); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. 
Kempthorne, 466 F.3d 1098, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006). That court seems oblivious to the resource-
constrained context of this struggle, though. 
 234. SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 65. 
 235. Instead, we have shifting and inconsistent applications of (vague) concepts like 
―distinct population segments,‖ see supra note 97 and accompanying text, incomplete economic 
analyses of the practical value of critical habitat designations, see supra notes 113, 130 and 
accompanying text, and cryptic legal norms like the Listing Priority Guidelines. See supra notes 
87, 201, 203, 232 and accompanying text. 
 236. See, e.g., CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
180 (1979) (―States are not sources of ends in the same sense as are persons. Instead, states are 
systems of shared practices and institutions within which communities of persons establish and 
advance their ends.‖). See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Making Governments Pay: Markets, 
Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000). 
 237. Cf. HOBBES, supra note 197 (conceiving of the ―state‖ as a legal person named 
―Leviathan‖). 
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viewing them as the networks of interconnected agents and teams 
they truly are.
238
 If decision costs are depleting the Services as actors, 
maybe they should simplify or shed some of those decisions. In other 
words, given that priority-setting and information availability are 
agent-centered, perhaps the wisest reform is to unbundle these steps 
as conservation tasks, distribute them to different agents, and monitor 
the way in which partnerships form. As Georgina Mace has argued, 
there are two fundamentally different kinds of actions conservation 
requires:  
On the one hand species are units for listing whereas on the 
other they are the identifiable targets for conservation actions 
on the ground. Both of these activities require that there is a 
valid and documented name, against which candidates for 
listing, protection and management can be tested. . . . 
However, listing on the one hand, and designing and 
implementing practical conservation actions in situ on the 
other, are very different processes. . . . [T]hese two kinds of 
major conservation activity . . . have different purposes, 
constraints, and requirements.
239
 
 As our rehearsals of the Canada lynx and Polar bear sagas 
underscored, establishing and describing relevant biological entities 
and the threats they face is its own struggle, rendered more 
treacherous by the vagaries of the biological species concept 
(―BSC‖).240 Without a stable identity, it is impossible to say what is at 
risk, and the truth is that, too often, biology raises more questions 
than it answers about natural kinds.
241
 The actual expression of those 
 
 238. See RUBIN, supra note 226, at 53 (―The network metaphor provides an alternative 
image of government to the . . . image of three separate branches.‖). 
 239. Georgina M. Mace, The Role of Taxonomy in Species Conservation, 359 PHIL. TRANS. 
R. SOC. LOND. 711, 713 (2004). 
 240. See Fuller, supra note 125; see also Agapow et al., supra note 126, at 163 (―BSC can 
illuminate only a small fragment of the Tree of Life.‖). 
 241. Cf. Brent D. Mishler & Robert N. Brandon, Individuality, Pluralism, and the 
Phylogenetic Species Concept, 2 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 397, 398 (1987) (―[N]either species nor 
other biological taxa can productively be viewed as sets or classes defined by possession of 
certain features.‖); see also T.E. Wilkerson, Species, Essences and the Names of Natural Kinds, 
43 PHIL. Q. 1, 3 (1993) (―We confidently apply the word ‗tiger‘, literally or metaphorically 
pointing to certain typical tigers, but may not have the faintest idea what actually determines 
membership of the kind.‖); Michael Donoghue, A Critique of the Biological Species Concept 
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kinds genetically, spatially, morphologically, and ecologically, is 
precisely what commends the decentralization and distribution of our 
decision making.
242
 The top-down BSC, in short, is probably coming 
to the end of its useful life.
243
 
Yet the actions that aim to protect habitat and reproduction in situ 
are equally complicated and no less cognitively demanding. Will the 
critical habitat designation measurably improve the Canada lynx‘s 
chances in the contiguous United States?
244
 On the evidence, it is 
essentially a coin flip.
245
 There certainly is a substantial federal role 
 
and Recommendations for a Phylogenetic Alternative, 88(3) THE BRYOLOGIST 172, 173 (1985) 
(―The biological species concept rests on the idea that interbreeding . . . is of prime importance 
in evolution, i.e., breeding determines whether morphological or ecological divergence can 
occur. This theory now appears grossly oversimplified and, as a result, so does the biological 
species concept.‖). 
 242. Shifting across these dimensions of natural kinds shifts conservation‘s spatial and 
temporal scales and can therefore shift its political salience, perhaps in counter-intuitively 
productive ways. Cf. Chrisoula Andreou, Environmental Preservation and Second-Order 
Procrastination, 35(3) PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 233 (2007) (arguing that persistent procrastination on 
conservation measures is not necessarily tantamount to hypocrisy and that some preferences are 
just not normally expressed until the prospect of looming losses). ―When there is nothing I need 
to do immediately but plenty I need to do at some point, I often break out of my list of things to 
do and start in right away on those tasks that I can clearly see my way to accomplishing.‖ Id. at 
248.  
 But note that experts contributing to one of the Services‘ section 4 status assessments are 
increasingly likely to be aware of the consequences that can flow from their choices and, 
therefore, that the continued lockstep linkage of risk assessment and risk management under the 
ESA will not necessarily optimize ―available‖ information. Experts, in particular, seem given to 
masking disagreements they cannot explain to non-experts. So, for example: 
[j]oint acceptance of a position is consistent with considerable disagreement among 
group members, and with considerable abstention as well. I may agree to let p stand as 
my group’s position, even though I myself reject it and accept q instead. . . . Given the 
meaning of joint acceptance, and the obligations incurred in an act of joint of 
acceptance, this form of agreement can clearly lead to the withholding of information 
about the state of knowledge, and especially t he extent of disagreement within a 
group. 
John Beatty, Masking Disagreement among Experts, 52 EPISTEME 53 (2006). Finally, given the 
pervasive human tendency to discount future consequences, dampening information flows in 
this way can make centralization into a recipe for inaction. Andreou, supra, at 245–48. 
 243. This is not to say that a reauthorized ESA would omit the species concept. Various 
bottom-up successors to the BSC, some quite powerful, have been in development for years. 
See Agapow et al., supra note 126, at 163. 
 244. See supra notes 44, 128, 132 and accompanying text. 
 245. Many types of evidence have, of course, been brought to bear on this and similar 
questions of habitat protection. See, e.g., Amara Brook et al., Landowners’ Responses to an 
Endangered Species Act Listing and Implications for Encouraging Conservation, 17 
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in protecting habitat, as I have argued elsewhere. But decoupling the 
different aspects of that role and distributing the pieces might allow 
the Services, for example, to develop exactly the kind of comparative 
institutional analyses needed for the choices ESA section 4(b)(3) 
prefigures.
246
 Furthermore, better distribution could reduce the 
―uncertainty absorption‖ for which complex organizations are 
notorious,
247
 bring greater cognitive diversity to bear in assessing the 
risks to nature‘s vast composition and complex functionality,248 
and—given our fragmentary jurisdictions—increase the opportunities 
to address those risks at a variety of spatial and temporal scales.
249
  
Thus, as presently constituted, the Services would perhaps do best 
to focus their energies on the ―status assessments‖ from which 
modern, evidence-based conservation begins.
250
 Marrying all of the 
uncertainties and conflicts that in situ conservation actions entail to 
the risk assessments that are already complicated by our biological 
sciences is almost certainly asking one agent to do too much.
251
 It 
 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1638 (2003); Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat 
Destruction under the Endangered Species Act, 46 J.L. & ECON. 27 (2003).  
 246. Professor Sinden argues that courts ought to expect less from the Services in these 
decisions, as if insistent litigants threatened by critical habitat designations will not simply shift 
their focus to some other (analytical) shortfall(s). See Sinden, supra note 128, at 161–83. More 
importantly, though, a sophisticated cost-benefit analysis of critical habitat designations as 
practical, in situ conservation measures might actually empower others to take cost-effective 
actions in service of the taxon‘s habitat needs and perhaps even to coordinate those actions at 
broader scales.  
 247. See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-
MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS (4th ed. 1997). 
 248. Cf. Kahan et al., supra note 159, at 1083–88 (collecting evidence suggesting that 
cognitive diversity ameliorates biases that often diminish the collective decision-making 
capacities of homogenous groups). 
 249. On the urgent need for this kind of diversification, see William W. Buzbee, 
Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 
(2003); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental 
Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A 
Public Policy Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001).  
 250. Cf. SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 48 (critiquing EPA ―risk assessment‖ 
and ―risk management‖ practices by observing that different kinds of professionals comprise 
the work teams doing one or the other and observing that risk assessors and risk managers have 
different roles). 
 251. Cf. SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 222–24.  
 [T]o ensure that risk assessments are maximally useful for risk-management 
decisions, the questions that risk assessments need to address must be raised before 
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compounds the practical problems of taxonomy with those of 
axiology—the study of quality and value—to create a cognitively 
gargantuan decision point. Combined, these two are making 
evidence-based conservation under the ESA incorrigibly complex 
and submerging it in an ocean of epistemic and normative conflict. 
The most plausible solution, in short, is to better distribute the tasks 
to prevent any one of them from dragging down the whole vessel. 
B. Integrative Conservation: Qualitative and Quantitative by Design 
Nature‘s composition and function are both vital and are both 
arguably in jeopardy.
252
 Focusing on one to the other‘s exclusion has 
always been a questionable interpretation of the ESA, to say nothing 
of our common purposes. But it has been over twenty years since 
Agee and Johnson‘s pioneering work emphasizing the sort of 
omniscient ―ecosystem management‖253 that the prophylactic 
guarding of both composition and function would entail. As we form 
our priorities, ESA section 4 status changes stand out for the 
unavoidably value-driven choices they entail. They showcase the 
importance of resource constraints and just how profoundly such 
choices are affected by the perspectives from which we approach 
them. ―Ask a hundred people to view a forest that has recently 
experienced a hurricane or crown fire, and few would say they are 
looking at a healthy ecosystem. From the perspective of a 
 
risk assessment is conducted and may need to be different from the questions that risk 
assessors have traditionally been tasked with answering. 
 . . . . 
[R]isk assessment is of little usefulness, and can even waste resources, if it is not 
oriented to help discriminate among risk-management options that have to be informed 
by risk (and often nonrisk) considerations. 
Id. 
 252. See J. Baird Callicott et al., Current Normative Concepts in Conservation, 13 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 22 (1998) (exploring the distinction between compositionalism and 
functionalism). Current extinction rates are thought to be three or four orders of magnitude 
greater than the norm (judging by the fossil record), imperiling both composition and function. 
See Stuart L. Pimm et al., The Future of Biodiversity, 269 SCIENCE 347, 347 (1995).  
 253. See ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT FOR PARKS AND WILDERNESS (James K. Agee & 
Darryll R. Johnson eds., 1988). 
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woodpecker or bark beetle, however, a forest with hundreds of dead 
trees is very healthy indeed.‖254  
The moral considerability of all people, of future people, and/or of 
only people is, in other words, fundamental to any real estimation of 
our collective priorities.
255
 Such considerations are deeply foreign to 
the administrative process, though. ESA decisions are made in a 
context that virtually precludes meaningful engagement on the big 
questions, ensuring that the deliberations they entail are far too costly 
for what they can possibly yield: a little help for a few taxa and a 
little public education.
256
 The ESA has evolved to a point where its 
quantitative aspirations are depleting and discrediting its 
fundamentally qualitative substance because the steps that ought to 
be decentralized and distributed are not, even while—at the same 
time—decisions that ought to be made carefully and authoritatively 
are over-abundant, over-partitioned, and lost in the commotion. 
Ironically enough, it was work on a single carnivore population, 
Yellowstone grizzlies, which pushed Agee and Johnson (and so many 
others) to scale up their assessments and managerial ambitions a 
generation ago.
257
 But it is a deeply political enterprise to raise the 
priority questions and engage them and the actors they interest in a 
full-scaled consideration of what we collectively view as desirable 
future conditions. This is perhaps why the ESA has limped along for 
eighteen years now without ever being reauthorized.
258
 The risks in 
so wide a political theatre—especially in the context of our anemic 
political culture—seem too daunting. The temptation is to keep 
finding Polar bears and using them as a kind of political judo.  
 
 254. Malcolm L. Hunter Jr., Refining Normative Concepts in Conservation, 14 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 573, 573 (2000). 
 255. For the record, I am deeply skeptical that we can rightly discount future lives. See, 
e.g., John Broome, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Population, 29 J. LEGAL STUDS. 953, 970 (2000). 
On the other hand, without doing so, the simple quantity of projected future lives quickly 
dwarves our own satisfaction in comparison.  
 256. Note that, by IUCN‘s criteria, for example, at least a quarter of all mammal species 
are at present risk of extinction. See Natasha Gilbert, A Quarter of Mammals Face Extinction, 
455 NATURE 717 (Oct. 9, 2008). 
 257. See ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT FOR PARKS AND WILDERNESS, supra note 253. 
 258. The statute has not been reauthorized since 1992. See Congressional Research 
Service, Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act (ESA): A Comparison of Pending Bills 
and Proposed Amendment with Current Law 1 (2006). 
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Yet if we aspire to anything like broad-scale conservation, the 
public‘s agents must find ways to study, describe, and propose the 
means of resilience—not as their managerial ends, but rather as 
robust and scalable metrics for everyone else to use. This would be a 
mission tailored to the networked, data-driven, multi-agent 
environments of today. Launching that mission would include (1) the 
immediate conduct of several cross-cutting ―value-of-information‖ 
analyses; (2) the design and incremental specification of measurable 
outcomes for various kinds of ―protected areas‖; (3) the development 
of models that describe how the human, biological, physical, and 
chemical components of the whole ―earth system‖ interact; (4) 
boosting the funding of basic research into the genetic and 
evolutionary processes of speciation; and (5) sorting out and ordering 
our now all-pervasive modes of ―informal‖ regulation.  
Taking them in order, ―[a] fundamental aspect of decision-making 
under uncertainty involves the inevitable choice between making an 
immediate decision with the information and analysis available and 
delaying the decision while, for example, more raw information is 
collected. . . .‖259 And several chronic sources of uncertainty across a 
variety of ESA contexts are, at least in theory, eliminable. Yet the 
Services have never developed generic methods for optimizing data 
collection/analysis efforts based on the expected practical value of 
the information to be gathered.
260
 This kind of meta-analysis is now 
standard in risk regulation, and it should be for biodiversity too.
261
 
 
 259. SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 82. 
 260. Demographic connectivity, for example, is an extremely promising—and under-
explored—field. See Stephen R. Palumbi, Population Genetics, Demographic Connectivity, and 
the Design of Marine Reserves, 13(1) ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS (Supplement) S146 (2003). 
A better understanding of demographic connectivity would enhance our ability to scale viability 
analyses and threat assessments of different kinds. For information that is likely of high value in 
ESA section 4 status changes and, in particular, priority ranking ―candidate‖ species, the overall 
representativeness and/or efficacy of surrogate (―keystone,‖ ―flagship,‖ ―umbrella,‖ etc.) 
species as managerial foci is another area the Services would both do well to investigate. See 
T.M. Caro & Gillian O‘Doherty, On the Use of Surrogate Species in Conservation Biology, 13 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 805 (1998). 
 261. Value-of-information (―VOI‖) analysis is decision-centric. ―In a VOI analysis, an 
information source is valued solely on the basis of the probability and magnitude of its potential 
impacts on a specific decision at a specific time with a specific state of prior knowledge.‖ 
SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 82. Given the diversity of decision makers governing 
habitat and other facets of conservation, this kind of analysis would inevitably draw in a range 
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Second, a generation after reinterpreting our parks, refuges, and other 
public lands as a network of so many ―protected areas,‖ we seem no 
closer to a concrete understanding of their needs or long-term 
performance.
262
 Today, we know that protectedness is relative and 
that a range of governance regimes encourage and discourage our 
various uses of land. Yet, from tax-subsidized conservation 
easements to critical habitat designations (barely restricting 
governmental action itself) to the massive sanctuaries like 
Yellowstone—and all manner of local and state variation in 
between—protected areas today are a broad, deep category with 
hardly any scalable metrics by which to benchmark their 
performances. Enumerating such metrics and identifying the 
thresholds at which these different regimes might actually pursue our 
optima should be a high priority.
263
 Third, ―it appears . . . that we are 
concentrating our monitoring efforts on species which most closely 
resemble ourselves, in places where people with the most money and 
spare time happen to live.‖264 Even a crude understanding of complex 
systems—and certainly our present knowledge of how tightly 
coupled systems interact—rejects that strategy. Lacking the 
panoramic data we need, though, the most we can do is to begin 
modeling and funding more basic research into how natural 
differentiation actually occurs.
265
  
 
of partners as parameters must be defined and quantified. See supra note 2 and accompanying 
text. 
 262. As I have argued elsewhere, the evidence we do have suggests that every protected 
area loses species richness over time. See Colburn, supra note 23, at 453–65. 
 263. See, e.g., Malcolm L. Hunter, Jr. et al., Thresholds and the Mismatch Between 
Environmental Laws and Ecosystems, 23 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1053, 1053 (2009). 
 264. Andrew Balmford et al., The 2010 Challenge: Data Availability, Information Needs 
and Extraterrestrial Insights, 360 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS BIOLOGICAL SCI. 221, 224 (2005). 
 265. See Andrew Balmford et al., The Convention on Biological Diversity’s 2010 Target, 
307 SCIENCE 212, 212–13 (Jan. 14, 2005) (arguing that the development of super-models that 
collocate human, biological, physical, and chemical components of the whole ―earth system‖ 
would at least guide future data collection efforts). Likewise, the state of actual research 
(largely simulations, models, and other mathematical gap-filling) into speciation and whether, 
for example, physical barriers always play roles in genotypic or phenotypic differentiation, 
remains primitive. See, e.g., M.A.M. de Aguiar et al., Global Patterns of Speciation and 
Diversity, 460 NATURE 384 (July 16, 2009) (reporting simulation results suggesting physical 
barriers are not necessary for speciation to occur and demographic stochasticity might be 
sufficient). Four decades after MacArthur and Wilson published The Theory of Island 
Biogeography, indeed, we still have but hypotheses on the basic relationships between 
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Finally, the path-dependence of the Polar bear and lynx sagas 
should remind us just how intertwined our normative and 
informational troubles have become. As our agencies drift toward 
increasingly informal modes of regulation, devices like the priority 
ranking guidelines,
266
 DPS policy,
267
 and FWS‘s professed disfavor 
of critical habitat designations,
268
 are guiding more and more legal 
agents without governing them.
269
 Never ―enacted‖ as such, these 
quasi-legal instruments are now affecting actions like listing 
determinations in rather inscrutable ways.
270
 If judicial review truly is 
a core mode of holding government accountable, the precise point 
and direction that these instruments enter into agency deliberations 
must be made clearer.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Our deepest trouble is that risk has no antonym. The future of 
biodiversity is a variety of loss scenarios—some worse than others—
and the only thing that can turn these risks into facts is time. Risk is 
an indexical expression of possible futures—one that implicitly 
brackets debates about, or the mediation of, harms to the present as 
such. Thus, to a significant degree, the normative considerations that 
define consequences as good or bad are obscured in the quantification 
of risk. And people bridle at the way such expressions constrain 
them. But failing or refusing to quantify risk because it might 
complicate the collective prioritizations we need to address risks—
because, for example, it ―disempowers‖271 the policymaker or the 
 
populations and environments. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HUBBELL, THE UNIFIED NEUTRAL 
THEORY OF BIODIVERSITY AND BIOGEOGRAPHY (2001). 
 266. See supra notes 201–06 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 100–08 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra notes 111–15, 119–23, 128–39 and accompanying text. 
 269. See Colburn, Agency Interpretations, supra note 33. 
 270. FWS‘s infamous ―Petition Management Guidance‖ highlighted this analytical 
problem with the Services‘ ―policies,‖ ―plans,‖ and ―guidelines.‖ See Am. Lands Alliance v. 
Norton, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2003); cf. Fischman, supra note 21, at 122 (arguing that 
Service ―policies‖ published as ―notices‖ in the Federal Register are more law-like than other 
internal agency communications and bind the agency until validly repealed or amended because 
they approximate the procedures set out in 5 U.S.C. § 553). 
 271. See Sinden, supra note 128, at 207. 
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public—is to leave our troubles ―hopelessly indeterminate‖272 just 
because quantification is necessarily progressive by nature. I have 
argued here that extinctions are a perfect example of how qualitative 
and quantitative factoring can integrate as a matter of practical 
agency. There are causes of extinction of which we are aware and 
causes of which we are unaware. And no matter what we discover or 
learn to measure, we never will be fully aware of all the possible 
causes of extinction or of the losses it represents. Refusing to 
enumerate and continuously refine the relevance of these different 
choice factors even while their ordinal ranking(s) remain undone (or 
provisional), though, is no more than a shabby pursuit of justice.
273
 It 
segregates one‘s actions from the many like-minded others whose 
cooperation so often turns on the kind of accountability, 
transparency, and communicative reciprocity that measurement and 
quantity have delivered in the modern world.
274
 Other minds can 
transform our understandings and experiences of quality and 
quantity. Establishing productive terms on which to engage them and 
their various cognitive advantages is our common challenge. 
 
 272. Sinden, supra note 128, at 210 (arguing that cost-benefit analysis ―produces 
hopelessly indeterminate results susceptible to easy challenge by anyone with the money to hire 
a Ph.D economist‖). Why it enhances determinacy to leave values unquantified—for Ph.D. 
moral philosophers to debate, one supposes—is a mystery to me.  
 273. We can hardly appropriately value one another with deliberations that occlude the 
very autonomous choices so central to our liberal commitments. See Steven M. DeLue, Public 
Reason and Democracy: The Place of Science in Maintaining Civic Friendship, in SCIENTIFIC 
VALUES AND CIVIC VIRTUES 25 (Noretta Koertge ed., 2005).  
 274. ―Transparency [is] likely to be effective when the new information [it] generate[s] can 
be easily embedded into the routines of information users and when information disclosers, in 
turn, embed users‘ changed choices in their decision making in ways that advance public aims.‖ 
ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 173–
74 (2007); cf. Mace et al., supra note 239, passim (arguing that the shift of IUCN‘s Red List 
Guidelines to quantitative criteria led to a transformative enhancement of their utility). ―The 
consequences of developing the new criteria have been far broader and deeper than could have 
been anticipated in the 1980s. Apart from its many uses in species conservation, the IUCN Red 
List is used in applied and theoretical conservation research, in legislation, and for national and 
international conservation planning and priority setting.‖ Id. at 1439. 
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